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1    Introduction This	  paper	  addresses	  the	  structural	  difficulties	  that	  the	  social	  entrepreneur	  meets	  when	  setting	  up	  her	  business.	  In	  addition,	  it	  responds	  to	  the	  narrow	  selection	  of	  literature	  there	  is	  to	  find	  on	  the	  company	  form	  known	  as	  the	  (svb)	  company,	  a	  company	  type	  that	  has	  existed	  since	  2006,	  but	  still	  remains	  rather	  unknown.	  The	  intention	  with	  this	  paper	  is	  to	  make	  a	  contribution	  in	  changing	  that.	  The	  paper	  is	  not,	  however,	  a	  paper	  on	  the	  (svb)	  company.	  It	  is	  rather	  an	  evaluation	  of	  the	  not-­‐for-­‐profit	  rationale,	  from	  its	  importance	  in	  the	  market	  economy,	  to	  its	  implementation	  in	  the	  legal	  body	  that	  will	  represent	  its	  activities.	  The	  (svb)	  company	  is	  both	  put	  forward	  and	  criticized	  as	  the	  result	  of	  this	  evaluation.	  This	  chapter	  starts	  with	  an	  introduction	  of	  the	  topic	  of	  the	  paper	  (section	  1.1),	  presenting	  the	  not-­‐for-­‐profit	  dilemma.	  It	  continues	  by	  presenting	  the	  purpose	  (section	  1.2),	  research	  questions	  (section	  1.3)	  and	  method	  (section	  1.4)	  of	  the	  paper,	  followed	  by	  some	  delimitations	  (section	  1.5)	  to	  give	  the	  reader	  the	  right	  expectations	  on	  the	  content.	  The	  disposition	  guides	  the	  reader	  quickly	  through	  the	  outline	  of	  the	  paper	  (section	  1.6),	  and	  the	  chapter	  ends	  with	  some	  reading	  directions	  to	  help	  the	  external	  reader	  focus	  on	  the	  relevant	  parts	  of	  the	  paper	  (section	  1.7).	  
1.1 Background	  
Private	  entrepreneurship	  as	  a	  response	  to	  the	  social	  challenges	  of	  a	  society	  is	  a	  hot	  topic	  today.	  The	  advantages	  of	  a	  free	  market	  are	  believed	  not	  only	  to	  be	  applicable	  on	  commercial	  activities,	  but	  also	  on	  social	  services,	  including	  the	  welfare	  services	  industry.1	  As	  a	  consequence,	  the	  public	  sector	  has	  been	  in	  competition	  during	  the	  last	  two	  decades	  with	  private	  actors	  delivering	  welfare	  services	  funded	  by	  public	  financing.2	  Most	  of	  these	  entrepreneurs	  are	  conducting	  their	  activities	  with	  a	  for-­‐profit	  purpose;	  although	  the	  services	  are	  benefiting	  the	  community,	  the	  enterprise	  can	  also	  generate	  and	  distribute	  profit.3	  Other	  factors	  than	  return-­‐on-­‐investment	  are	  however	  starting	  to	  become	  recognized	  as	  incitements	  for	  conducting	  a	  successful	  business.	  Some	  researchers	  and	  universities	  want	  to	  see	  their	  results	  utilized	  for	  the	  benefit	  of	  society	  without	  profit	  motives,	  and	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1 DG Regional and Urban Policy. Guide to Social Innovation, 5. 
2 Nilsson. ”Starkt stöd för välfärdsstaten”, 290-291. 
3 Nilsson. ”Nej till vinstutdelning – Ja till valfrihet i välfärden”, 309. 
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entrepreneurs	  are	  starting	  to	  show	  interest	  in	  running	  businesses	  not-­‐for-­‐
profit.4	  The	  not-­‐for-­‐profit	  purpose	  has	  no	  obvious	  place	  in	  the	  world	  of	  enterprises.	  The	  legislator	  has	  the	  for-­‐profit	  purpose	  as	  a	  benchmark	  for	  bodies	  with	  businesslike	  methods,5	  and	  traditionally,	  social	  purposes	  are	  more	  commonly	  found	  in	  non-­‐profit	  organizations	  such	  as	  associations	  and	  foundations.	  There	  is	  one	  businesslike	  body	  strictly	  not-­‐for-­‐profit,	  the	  (svb)	  company,	  but	  it	  has	  had	  limited	  impact	  so	  far.	  The	  social	  enterprise,	  a	  company	  without	  profit	  motives,	  seems	  to	  be	  difficult	  to	  incarnate	  in	  the	  existing	  legal	  bodies,	  and	  in	  this	  paper	  I	  will	  discuss	  some	  of	  the	  reasons	  why.	  
1.2 Purpose	  The	  purpose	  of	  this	  paper	  is	  to	  examine	  to	  what	  extent	  the	  existing	  legal	  bodies	  in	  general,	  and	  the	  limited	  liability	  company	  in	  particular,	  support	  the	  concept	  of	  a	  social	  enterprise	  in	  the	  welfare	  industry.	  
1.3 Research	  questions	  In	  order	  to	  reach	  the	  above	  stated	  purpose,	  I	  will	  answer	  the	  following	  questions.	  1. Is	  there	  a	  place	  for	  a	  social	  enterprise	  in	  the	  welfare	  industry?	  2. What	  are	  the	  requirements	  on	  the	  embodiment	  of	  a	  social	  enterprise?	  3. Does	  the	  limited	  liability	  company	  fulfill	  these	  requirements?	  4. Does	  the	  (svb)	  company	  fulfill	  these	  requirements?	  5. Why	  has	  the	  (svb)	  company	  not	  been	  successful	  as	  an	  alternative	  for	  social	  enterprises?	  
1.4 Method	  In	  this	  section,	  I	  present	  how	  data	  have	  been	  gathered	  and	  interpreted	  (section	  1.4.1),	  the	  ontological	  considerations	  that	  are	  made	  (section	  1.4.2),	  and	  how	  I	  have	  handled	  issues	  of	  reliability	  and	  validity	  (section	  1.4.3).	  
1.4.1 Data collection and interpretation In	  order	  to	  answer	  question	  1,	  the	  paper	  first	  examines	  how	  the	  market	  today	  is	  divided	  between	  the	  public	  sector,	  the	  private	  sector	  and	  the	  private	  not-­‐for-­‐profit	  third	  sector	  in	  order	  to	  establish	  the	  prerequisites.	  This	  is	  based	  on	  research	  performed	  by	  SOM-­‐institutet	  at	  the	  University	  of	  Gothenburg,	  which	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
4 Ström. 
5 See e.g. SFS 2005:551. Aktiebolagslag, 3:3. 
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investigates	  the	  public’s	  relation	  to	  the	  welfare	  state,	  and	  data	  presented	  by	  Statistiska	  Centralbyrån.	  The	  paper	  then	  examines	  the	  market	  need	  for	  a	  third	  sector	  by	  looking	  at	  the	  public’s	  opinions	  concerning	  for-­‐profit	  in	  the	  private	  sector.	  This	  is	  also	  based	  on	  extensive	  statistics	  performed	  by	  SOM-­‐institutet	  during	  almost	  30	  years.	  In	  order	  to	  establish	  whether	  it	  is	  realistic	  to	  view	  the	  third	  sector	  as	  a	  serious	  competitor	  in	  the	  private	  welfare	  market,	  research	  is	  laid	  forward	  comparing	  efficiency	  between	  for-­‐profit	  and	  not-­‐for	  profit.	  This	  is	  based	  on	  Swedish,	  British	  and	  American	  studies	  on	  the	  subject.	  The	  political	  and	  the	  public’s	  views	  on	  the	  private	  not-­‐for-­‐profit	  sector	  are	  then	  used	  in	  order	  to	  further	  examine	  the	  market	  need	  for	  the	  third	  sector.	  This	  is	  based	  on	  SOM-­‐institutet’s	  research,	  as	  well	  as	  the	  European	  Commission’s	  guidelines	  on	  the	  subject	  of	  social	  innovation.	  Question	  2	  is	  answered	  by	  first	  establishing	  what	  a	  social	  enterprise	  is,	  by	  looking	  at	  the	  definitions	  presented	  by	  the	  European	  Commission,	  Sektor3,	  and	  the	  International	  Center	  for	  Non-­‐profit	  Law.	  In	  order	  to	  establish	  the	  requirements	  on	  a	  body	  for	  a	  social	  enterprise,	  the	  paper	  then	  focuses	  on	  the	  conditions	  that	  can	  differ	  between	  a	  for-­‐profit	  and	  a	  not-­‐for-­‐profit	  enterprise,	  and	  analyzes	  how	  these	  conditions	  have	  certain	  implications.	  The	  pilot	  project	  GPCC	  Implement	  performed	  by	  the	  University	  of	  Gothenburg	  is	  in	  this	  used	  as	  a	  case	  study.	  In	  this	  project,	  an	  essential	  part	  was	  to	  set	  up	  an	  appropriate	  legal	  body	  for	  the	  utilization	  of	  certain	  research	  results.	  Involved	  actors	  were	  the	  center	  GPCC,	  the	  Grants	  and	  Innovation	  Office,	  and	  GU	  Holding	  AB,	  among	  others.	  The	  requirements	  of	  the	  body	  was	  different	  from	  the	  University’s	  usual	  utilization	  ventures,	  since	  the	  project	  was	  financed	  by	  public	  means	  as	  well	  as	  having	  public	  customers.	  A	  not-­‐for-­‐profit	  rationale	  was	  therefore	  agreed	  upon,	  instead	  of	  a	  commercial	  venture.	  From	  this	  project,	  qualitative	  data	  was	  drawn	  after	  I	  presented	  all	  the	  possible	  legal	  structures	  available	  for	  the	  project	  and	  their	  implications.	  The	  concerns,	  questions	  and	  feedback	  from	  the	  steering	  group	  of	  the	  project	  were	  noted	  and	  used	  as	  a	  source	  for	  what	  deliberations	  need	  to	  be	  taken	  for	  a	  not-­‐for-­‐profit	  venture.	  To	  answer	  question	  3,	  the	  views	  of	  several	  academics	  on	  the	  limited	  liability	  company’s	  for-­‐profit	  purpose	  are	  first	  presented	  to	  draw	  some	  conclusions	  on	  how	  the	  for-­‐profit	  purpose	  can	  be	  problematic	  when	  other	  values	  are	  conflicting.	  The	  selection	  is	  chosen	  based	  on	  the	  discussions	  started	  by	  Berle	  and	  Means.6	  7	  The	  cited	  literature	  portrays	  a	  selection	  of	  opinions	  that	  have	  influentially	  criticized	  the	  purpose	  of	  the	  enterprise.	  The	  purpose	  of	  the	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
6 Berle & Means. The Modern Corporation & Private Property, 220. 
7 Dotevall. Skadeståndsansvar för styrelseledamot och verkställande direktör, 375-377. 
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section	  is	  to	  show	  that	  several	  voices	  have	  been	  raised	  against	  a	  strict	  for-­‐profit	  purpose	  in	  the	  past.	  The	  paper	  then	  examines	  the	  not-­‐for-­‐profit	  purpose	  of	  the	  limited	  liability	  company	  by	  analyzing	  how	  well	  other	  sections	  of	  the	  Company’s	  Act	  support	  the	  not-­‐for-­‐profit	  purpose	  that	  can	  be	  chosen	  according	  to	  3:3	  in	  the	  Company’s	  Act.	  In	  the	  examination	  I	  use	  an	  interpretation	  of	  the	  law	  comparing	  its	  intention	  to	  the	  results.	  In	  this,	  the	  preparatory	  works	  of	  the	  Companies	  Act	  play	  an	  important	  role.	  Chapter	  32	  of	  the	  Companies	  Act	  was	  a	  direct	  political	  effort	  to	  enable	  and	  encourage	  social	  entrepreneurship,8	  and	  the	  comparison	  between	  the	  intention	  of	  the	  legislation	  and	  its	  results	  are	  therefore	  relevant.	  The	  intention	  of	  the	  legislation	  is	  also	  interesting	  in	  the	  light	  of	  the	  establishment	  of	  public	  opinion	  that	  strongly	  influences	  the	  paper.	  Question	  4	  is	  answered	  by	  initially	  laying	  out	  the	  purpose	  of	  the	  (svb)	  company	  to	  see	  if	  it	  corresponds	  to	  the	  purpose	  of	  the	  social	  enterprise.	  This	  is	  done	  by	  comparing	  the	  motives	  for	  chapter	  32	  in	  the	  Company’s	  Act	  to	  the	  definition	  of	  the	  social	  enterprise.	  In	  order	  to	  analyze	  whether	  the	  (svb)	  company	  structure	  also	  in	  practice	  supports	  the	  inhabitation	  of	  a	  social	  enterprise,	  the	  specific	  character	  of	  the	  (svb)	  company	  is	  first	  presented,	  from	  which	  some	  consequences	  are	  drawn	  based	  on	  the	  concerns	  in	  the	  pilot	  project	  GPCC	  Implement	  and	  an	  analysis	  performed	  by	  KPMG.	  Additionally,	  the	  experiences	  of	  the	  (svb)	  company	  Mitt	  Liv	  AB	  (svb)	  are	  used.	  Finally,	  question	  5	  is	  answered	  by	  comparing	  the	  (svb)	  company	  with	  other	  setups	  for	  not-­‐for-­‐profit	  enterprises	  in	  the	  UK	  and	  the	  US	  that	  have	  been	  more	  successful	  than	  the	  (svb)	  company	  in	  Sweden.	  This	  comparison	  also	  is	  the	  foundation	  for	  the	  suggestions	  for	  the	  improvement	  of	  the	  (svb)	  company.	  
1.4.2 Ontology The	  enterprise	  is	  merely	  a	  social	  vehicle	  for	  transactions	  that	  are	  the	  foundation	  for	  what	  we	  call	  a	  business.	  	  The	  intention	  is	  to	  show	  how	  the	  requirements	  of	  this	  social	  vehicle	  are	  met	  by	  the	  regulations	  we	  acknowledge	  as	  factoid,	  influenced	  by	  the	  subjective	  opinions	  of	  people.	  The	  paper	  has	  a	  constructionist	  view	  on	  both	  the	  enterprise	  and	  the	  law,	  by	  showing	  how	  the	  use	  of	  one	  social	  construction	  (legislation)	  can	  affect	  another	  social	  construction	  (the	  company)	  in	  order	  to	  promote	  the	  values	  that	  the	  community	  of	  external	  actors	  (the	  public)	  prefers.	  By	  doing	  so,	  the	  social	  phenomena	  of	  the	  company	  and	  the	  law	  are	  portrayed	  as	  created	  by	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
8 Prop 2004/05:178, 18. 
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society,	  entirely	  dependent	  on	  what	  is	  agreed	  in	  society,	  and	  therefore	  also	  changeable.	  
1.4.3 Reliability and validity In	  section	  2.2,	  I	  examine	  the	  public’s	  view	  on	  for-­‐profit	  and	  not-­‐for-­‐profit.	  In	  order	  to	  do	  this,	  I	  have	  used	  almost	  thirty	  years	  of	  research	  performed	  by	  SOM-­‐institutet.	  Unfortunately,	  SOM-­‐institutet	  has	  only	  performed	  polls	  concerning	  dividends	  in	  tax-­‐financed	  welfare	  since	  2012,	  which	  means	  that	  it	  is	  not	  possible	  to	  deduce	  long-­‐term	  trends	  in	  opinion	  from	  this	  data.	  Instead,	  I	  have	  drawn	  parallels	  from	  opinions	  concerning	  other	  sides	  of	  the	  welfare	  state,	  which	  have	  shown	  clear	  overall	  trends	  concerning	  the	  decrease	  of	  the	  welfare	  state.	  These	  trends	  are	  coherent	  with	  the	  current	  opinions	  on	  dividends.	  Section	  2.3	  is	  based	  on	  research	  on	  efficiency.	  As	  I	  make	  clear	  in	  this	  section,	  research	  about	  the	  consequences	  of	  the	  welfare	  reform	  is	  to	  a	  large	  extent	  missing.	  This	  section	  must	  therefore	  be	  viewed	  as	  examination	  of	  the	  notion	  that	  there	  is	  clear	  evidence	  of	  efficiency	  in	  for-­‐profit	  enterprises.	  The	  section	  should	  not	  be	  taken	  as	  evidence	  in	  favor	  of	  not-­‐for-­‐profit.	  The	  analysis	  on	  what	  characteristics	  are	  most	  important	  for	  a	  social	  enterprise,	  and	  how	  well	  these	  fit	  with	  the	  limited	  liability	  company	  as	  well	  as	  the	  (svb)	  company	  is	  in	  part	  based	  on	  the	  requirements	  of	  the	  stakeholders	  in	  the	  pilot	  project	  GPCC	  Implement	  and	  the	  reflections	  from	  the	  (svb)	  founder	  of	  Mitt	  Liv	  AB	  (svb).	  This	  qualitative	  data	  serves	  as	  a	  confirmation	  of	  the	  reliability	  of	  more	  quantitative	  data.	  Additionally,	  KPMG	  did	  an	  analysis	  of	  what	  a	  shift	  to	  (svb)	  would	  mean,	  the	  results	  of	  which	  corresponds	  with	  the	  interviews	  and	  conclusions	  drawn	  from	  the	  pilot	  project.	  
1.5 Delimitations	  This	  paper	  will	  focus	  on	  the	  Swedish	  limited	  liability	  company	  as	  a	  vehicle	  for	  social	  entrepreneurship.	  Although	  other	  legal	  bodies	  are	  mentioned,	  they	  are	  not	  investigated	  thoroughly.	  This	  is	  the	  consequence	  of	  the	  limited	  liability	  company	  being	  the	  only	  body	  with	  the	  combination	  of	  limited	  personal	  liability	  for	  the	  company’s	  owners/members,	  possibility	  for	  a	  social	  purpose,	  qualified	  membership	  and	  detailed	  regulations.	  These	  are	  characteristics	  that	  are	  crucial	  for	  the	  social	  enterprise,	  as	  I	  will	  show	  in	  section	  3.3.	  The	  paper	  discusses	  social	  entrepreneurship	  in	  general,	  but	  the	  focus	  is	  set	  on	  the	  welfare	  industry.	  The	  welfare	  industry	  differs	  from	  the	  general	  social	  industry	  mainly	  in	  two	  ways.	  First,	  it	  is	  an	  industry	  that	  is	  more	  controlled	  than	  other	  industries	  by	  several	  additional	  regulations.	  Two	  specific	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regulations	  discussed	  in	  the	  paper	  are	  The	  Act	  on	  Public	  Procurement	  and	  the	  Act	  on	  Freedom	  of	  Choice.	  The	  healthcare	  industry	  is	  affected	  by	  several	  other	  regulations	  as	  well,	  which	  will	  not	  be	  discussed	  in	  this	  paper.	  Second,	  welfare	  is	  financed	  by	  taxes.	  This	  creates	  other	  expectations	  on	  how	  the	  funds	  are	  used.	  By	  specifically	  investigating	  the	  welfare	  industry	  instead	  of	  the	  whole	  social	  industry,	  these	  two	  specific	  circumstances	  can	  be	  used	  as	  affecting	  factors.	  A	  comparative	  study	  is	  performed	  in	  the	  end	  of	  this	  paper	  (chapter	  6).	  The	  study	  looks	  at	  British	  as	  well	  as	  American	  legislation,	  but	  is	  more	  focused	  on	  the	  company	  regulations	  of	  the	  United	  Kingdom	  than	  the	  US.	  The	  rationale	  is	  that	  the	  Community	  Interest	  Company	  in	  the	  UK	  and	  the	  Swedish	  (svb)	  company	  have	  been	  around	  for	  about	  the	  same	  time,	  and	  that	  the	  Swedish	  (svb)	  company	  legislation	  was	  created	  with	  an	  eye	  looking	  at	  the	  British	  equivalent.	  The	  comparison	  is	  also	  of	  interest	  as	  the	  results	  have	  differed	  substantially.	  Other	  states’	  company	  types	  are	  not	  investigated	  and	  the	  examples	  are	  not	  meant	  to	  give	  a	  complete	  picture	  of	  how	  not-­‐for-­‐profit	  companies	  function	  around	  the	  world.	  They	  are	  chosen	  because	  of	  their	  recognition	  in	  the	  literature	  and	  the	  relevance	  of	  a	  comparison.	  
1.6 Disposition	  In	  this	  paper	  I	  first	  discuss	  the	  not-­‐for-­‐profit	  rationale	  in	  chapter	  2.	  The	  chapter	  starts	  by	  explaining	  how	  the	  welfare	  industry	  has	  developed	  from	  an	  entirely	  public	  sector	  to	  a	  partial	  private	  sector	  with	  for-­‐profit	  purposes	  (section	  2.1).	  I	  then	  discuss	  the	  problems	  with	  for-­‐profit	  in	  welfare	  with	  a	  focus	  on	  public	  opinion	  (section	  2.2),	  and	  present	  the	  research	  supporting	  not-­‐for-­‐profit	  from	  the	  perspective	  of	  efficiency	  (section	  2.3).	  I	  introduce	  the	  concept	  of	  social	  innovation	  as	  an	  alternative	  to	  the	  for-­‐profit	  rationale	  (section	  2.4),	  and	  the	  chapter	  ends	  with	  a	  conclusion	  that	  there	  is	  a	  place	  for	  social	  enterprises	  today	  (section	  2.5).	  Chapter	  3	  discusses	  the	  social	  enterprise	  as	  a	  concept.	  In	  order	  to	  find	  a	  suitable	  legal	  body	  for	  the	  social	  enterprise,	  I	  describe	  the	  defining	  characteristics	  (section	  3.1),	  based	  on	  the	  commonly	  accepted	  meaning	  of	  the	  term	  (section	  3.2).	  Looking	  at	  the	  defining	  characteristics,	  I	  analyze	  what	  requirements	  there	  are	  on	  the	  embodiment	  of	  the	  social	  enterprise	  (section	  3.3).	  In	  chapter	  4,	  I	  examine	  the	  limited	  liability	  company	  to	  see	  if	  it	  serves	  as	  a	  good	  fit	  for	  the	  social	  enterprise.	  I	  present	  perspectives	  on	  the	  for-­‐profit	  purpose	  of	  the	  company	  to	  show	  how	  the	  notion	  of	  a	  limited	  liability	  company	  with	  other	  interests	  than	  merely	  profit	  are	  neither	  new	  nor	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opposing	  the	  structure	  of	  the	  legislation	  today	  (section	  4.1).	  Following,	  I	  analyze	  the	  not-­‐for-­‐profit	  purpose	  of	  the	  company	  to	  show	  how	  the	  limited	  liability	  company	  has	  weaknesses	  when	  it	  comes	  to	  actually	  serving	  other	  objectives	  than	  the	  shareholders’	  (section	  4.2).	  The	  chapter	  ends	  with	  the	  conclusion	  that	  even	  though	  the	  limited	  liability	  company	  is	  supposed	  to	  work	  for	  for-­‐profit	  as	  well	  as	  other	  purposes,	  this	  is	  not	  necessarily	  the	  case	  (section	  4.3).	  I	  apply	  the	  same	  logic	  to	  the	  (svb)	  company	  in	  chapter	  5.	  I	  start	  by	  describing	  the	  purpose	  of	  the	  (svb)	  company	  from	  the	  viewpoint	  of	  the	  legislator	  (section	  5.1).	  A	  brief	  description	  of	  the	  company’s	  special	  regulations	  follows	  to	  update	  the	  reader	  who	  is	  not	  familiar	  with	  the	  company	  type	  (section	  5.2).	  I	  continue	  by	  analyzing	  the	  consequences	  of	  the	  special	  regulations	  in	  order	  to	  give	  the	  reader	  a	  perspective	  of	  the	  implementation	  of	  the	  (svb)	  company	  (section	  5.3).	  The	  chapter	  ends	  with	  an	  analysis	  of	  the	  appropriateness	  of	  the	  (svb)	  company	  for	  a	  social	  enterprise	  (section	  5.4).	  Chapter	  6	  discusses	  why	  the	  (svb)	  company	  has	  not	  been	  able	  to	  succeed	  in	  Sweden	  in	  spite	  of	  its	  suitability	  for	  not-­‐for-­‐profit	  enterprises.	  The	  most	  important	  factors	  are	  concluded	  to	  be	  the	  lack	  of	  incentives	  (section	  6.1),	  the	  missing	  political	  opinion-­‐making	  and	  facilitating	  supporting	  measures	  (section	  6.2),	  the	  difficulty	  for	  the	  (svb)	  entrepreneur	  to	  be	  competitive	  due	  to	  regulations	  favoring	  big	  companies	  (section	  6.3)	  and	  the	  lack	  of	  credibility	  the	  legal	  body	  has	  attained	  during	  the	  nine	  years	  it	  has	  existed	  (6.4).	  The	  paper	  ends	  with	  chapter	  7,	  consisting	  of	  a	  summary	  of	  conclusions	  drawn	  in	  the	  previous	  chapters.	  The	  chapter	  further	  provides	  some	  suggestions	  to	  how	  the	  (svb)	  company	  could	  be	  improved	  to	  become	  successful.	  
1.7 Reading	  directions	  For	  the	  entrepreneur	  reading	  this	  paper,	  the	  focus	  should	  be	  on	  chapters	  2,	  3	  and	  5,	  which	  will	  serve	  as	  a	  good	  foundation	  for	  making	  a	  choice	  whether	  to	  choose	  the	  (svb)	  company	  as	  an	  alternative	  for	  her	  business.	  Chapter	  2	  and	  3	  explain	  why	  the	  social	  enterprise	  can	  add	  value	  to	  the	  business,	  and	  chapter	  5	  describes	  the	  essentials	  of	  the	  (svb)	  company.	  The	  objective	  is	  to	  give	  the	  person	  considering	  using	  the	  (svb)	  company	  form	  insight	  into	  what	  the	  advantages	  as	  well	  as	  the	  risks	  are	  in	  order	  to	  make	  an	  informed	  decision.	  	  For	  the	  academic	  readers,	  such	  as	  students,	  researchers	  and	  teachers	  within	  the	  field	  of	  study,	  the	  entire	  paper	  should	  be	  of	  interest,	  but	  chapter	  4	  and	  6	  has	  a	  main	  focus	  on	  the	  legal	  aspects	  of	  the	  subject.	  The	  critique	  against	  the	  not-­‐for-­‐profit	  purpose	  of	  the	  limited	  liability	  company	  in	  chapter	  4	  is	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intended	  to	  give	  a	  different	  perspective	  on	  3:3	  in	  the	  Companies	  Act,	  while	  chapter	  6	  can	  help	  put	  the	  Swedish	  legislation	  in	  context.	  Readers	  of	  this	  type	  who	  are	  not	  familiar	  with	  the	  (svb)	  company	  are	  also	  strongly	  advised	  to	  read	  chapter	  5	  to	  get	  a	  brief	  insight	  to	  this	  company	  type.	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2 For-profit or not-for-profit? The	  concept	  of	  welfare	  is	  strongly	  associated	  with	  the	  public	  sector,	  where	  the	  choice	  between	  for-­‐profit	  or	  not-­‐for-­‐profit	  is	  given.	  With	  welfare	  services	  being	  performed	  by	  private	  actors,	  it	  is	  however	  highly	  relevant	  to	  consider	  the	  different	  aspects	  of	  the	  alternatives.	  Discussions	  regarding	  whether	  private	  actors	  within	  welfare	  should	  be	  allowed	  to	  have	  profit	  motives	  are	  today	  of	  interest	  economically	  as	  well	  as	  politically.	  Still,	  questions	  can	  be	  raised	  concerning	  the	  market	  space	  for	  not-­‐for-­‐profit	  actors	  in	  the	  welfare	  system.	  With	  private	  for-­‐profit	  companies	  acting	  as	  alternatives	  to	  the	  public	  sector	  the	  public	  can	  choose	  how	  and	  by	  whom	  it	  wants	  welfare	  delivered.	  If	  not-­‐for-­‐profit	  is	  to	  be	  recognized	  as	  an	  alternative	  to	  the	  established	  institutions,	  a	  clear	  demand	  must	  be	  formulated.	  This	  chapter	  starts	  with	  a	  background	  on	  how	  Sweden	  created	  a	  unique	  private	  sphere	  for	  for-­‐profit	  actors	  within	  welfare	  (section	  2.1).	  I	  then	  lay	  out	  the	  critique	  from	  the	  public	  against	  this	  setup	  as	  the	  foundation	  for	  the	  not-­‐for-­‐profit	  motives	  (section	  2.2).	  Following,	  relevant	  research	  is	  presented	  comparing	  for-­‐profit	  and	  not-­‐for-­‐profit	  to	  further	  increase	  the	  understanding	  of	  the	  how	  not-­‐for-­‐profit	  enterprises	  has	  a	  role	  to	  play	  (section	  2.3).	  Political	  and	  popular	  opinions	  on	  social	  entrepreneurship	  continue	  to	  support	  the	  not-­‐for-­‐profit	  notion	  (section	  2.4),	  and	  the	  chapter	  ends	  with	  the	  conclusion	  that	  there	  is	  a	  place	  for	  social	  enterprising	  in	  Sweden	  (section	  2.5).	  
2.1 A	  development	  towards	  for-­‐profit	  enterprises	  Especially	  during	  the	  1960s	  and	  ’70s	  Sweden	  built	  up	  an	  extensive	  welfare	  state	  to	  handle	  the	  new	  challenges	  that	  had	  grown	  during	  the	  1900s.	  Women	  performing	  paid	  work,	  changed	  forms	  of	  coexistence,	  fewer	  births	  of	  children	  and	  a	  larger	  population	  of	  elderly	  created	  a	  demand	  for	  the	  state	  to	  take	  on	  new	  responsibilities.	  In	  the	  end	  of	  the	  1980s	  the	  way	  welfare	  was	  delivered	  changed,	  moving	  from	  the	  public	  sector	  towards	  a	  private	  sector.	  Right-­‐wing	  trends	  from	  the	  Anglo-­‐American	  states	  and	  the	  fall	  of	  communism	  affected	  the	  political	  views	  in	  Europe	  and	  Sweden.	  A	  new	  aim	  was	  to	  have	  a	  limited	  public	  sector	  only	  contributing	  with	  certain	  necessary	  societal	  functions.	  9	  Since	  then,	  the	  development	  has	  gone	  towards	  a	  decrease	  in	  the	  size	  of	  the	  welfare	  state.	  Social	  democratic	  governments	  have	  decentralized	  and	  deregulated	  while	  liberal	  governments	  have	  decreased	  the	  public	  sector	  and	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
9 Nilsson. ”Välfärdspolitik och välfärdsopinion 1986-2012”, 71. 
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privatized.10	  A	  report	  from	  Statistiska	  centralbyrån	  shows	  that	  the	  size	  of	  the	  public	  sector	  has	  steadily	  decreased	  during	  the	  last	  decades,	  partly	  because	  private	  companies	  perform	  more	  of	  the	  tax	  financed	  welfare	  services.11	  Privatization	  of	  large	  parts	  of	  what	  was	  once	  only	  handled	  by	  the	  state	  is	  today	  reality.	  Distinctive	  for	  the	  new	  development	  is	  the	  orientation	  towards	  for-­‐profit	  enterprises.	  The	  third	  sector	  of	  economic	  and	  non-­‐profit	  associations,	  foundations	  and	  religious	  bodies,	  as	  well	  as	  other	  not-­‐for-­‐profit	  organizations,	  continue	  to	  amount	  to	  only	  a	  small	  part	  of	  the	  non-­‐public	  activities.12	  This	  development	  in	  Sweden	  differs	  from	  the	  other	  Nordic	  countries.	  The	  substantial	  responsibility	  for	  provision	  of	  welfare	  services	  cannot	  be	  seen	  in	  the	  private	  sectors	  of	  our	  neighbors.13	  In	  Europe,	  it	  is	  common	  to	  have	  both	  private	  companies	  and	  non-­‐profit	  associations	  delivering	  healthcare,	  and	  legislation	  promotes	  these	  kinds	  of	  activities	  in	  many	  cases.14	  The	  Swedish	  situation	  is	  in	  this	  way	  unique.	  
2.2 The	  resistance	  towards	  for-­‐profit	  in	  welfare	  Profit	  within	  welfare	  has	  been	  a	  debated	  topic	  the	  last	  years.	  Vänsterpartiet	  (the	  left	  party)	  has	  demanded	  prohibitions	  against	  profit,	  Socialdemokraterna	  (the	  social	  democrats),	  Miljöpartiet	  (the	  green	  party)	  and	  LO	  (the	  union	  of	  labor’s	  organizations),	  has	  adopted	  the	  viewpoint	  of	  limiting	  the	  possibilities	  of	  distributing	  dividends,	  and	  Sverigedemokraterna	  (the	  far-­‐right	  nationalists)	  suggests	  stricter	  regulations	  against	  dividends.	  At	  the	  other	  end	  of	  the	  political	  sphere	  the	  liberal	  parties	  Moderaterna,	  Folkpartiet,	  Kristdemokraterna	  and	  Centerpartiet	  (the	  right-­‐wing	  parties)	  emphasize	  that	  freedom	  of	  choice	  demands	  private	  for-­‐profit	  alternatives,	  and	  that	  efficiency	  is	  stimulated	  by	  private	  enterprises.15	  The	  public’s	  opinion	  does	  not	  mirror	  the	  equilibrium	  in	  opinion	  that	  can	  be	  seen	  in	  the	  political	  layer.	  A	  public	  opinion	  poll	  performed	  by	  SOM-­‐institutet	  in	  2013	  shows	  that	  almost	  70	  %	  of	  the	  respondents	  were	  positive	  towards	  not	  allowing	  dividends	  in	  healthcare,	  education	  and	  nursing	  care	  companies	  financed	  by	  taxes.	  In	  addition,	  around	  50	  %	  of	  the	  respondents	  considered	  it	  a	  very	  good	  suggestion,	  something	  that	  according	  to	  SOM-­‐institutet	  is	  very	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
10 Nilsson. ”Starkt stöd för välfärdsstaten”, 290-291. 
11 Bendz. ”Att ge feedback på välfärdspolitiken”, 295. 
12 Nilsson. ”Nej till vinstutdelning – Ja till valfrihet i välfärden”, 309. 
13 Nilsson. ”Starkt stöd för välfärdsstaten”, 291. 
14 Nilsson. ”Nej till vinstutdelning – Ja till valfrihet i välfärden”, 309. 
15 Nilsson. ”Välfärdspolitik och välfärdsopinion 1986-2012, 86-87. 
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uncommon	  for	  these	  types	  of	  political	  questions,	  and	  says	  something	  about	  the	  intensity	  of	  the	  subject.	  	  Less	  than	  15	  %	  considered	  it	  a	  bad	  suggestion.	  All	  parties	  had	  a	  majority	  of	  their	  sympathizers	  not	  wanting	  to	  allow	  dividends.	  Even	  among	  the	  ones	  who	  had	  chosen	  private	  alternatives,	  two	  thirds	  were	  for	  prohibiting	  dividends.16	  The	  same	  kind	  of	  poll	  made	  in	  2012	  showed	  that	  62	  %	  considered	  prohibition	  a	  good	  suggestion.	  Around	  40	  %	  considered	  it	  a	  very	  good	  suggestion.	  Only	  16	  %	  of	  respondents	  considered	  it	  a	  bad	  suggestion.17	  In	  another	  public	  opinion	  poll	  from	  Novus	  in	  2012	  as	  few	  as	  12	  %	  answered	  that	  dividends	  should	  be	  allowed	  in	  private	  welfare	  companies,	  while	  53	  %	  believed	  that	  profits	  should	  be	  reinvested	  in	  the	  business.	  An	  additional	  31	  %	  opposed	  profit-­‐driven	  companies	  in	  welfare	  completely.18	  All	  three	  polls	  show	  strong	  resistance	  towards	  for-­‐profit	  in	  welfare.	  SOM-­‐institutet	  has	  only	  performed	  polls	  concerning	  dividends	  in	  welfare	  since	  2012,19	  but	  trends	  can	  be	  seen	  in	  the	  opinions	  concerning	  the	  size	  of	  the	  public	  sector	  and	  privatization	  over	  a	  longer	  period	  of	  time.	  The	  biggest	  support	  for	  privatization	  occurred	  after	  the	  fall	  of	  the	  Berlin	  Wall,	  the	  dismantling	  of	  the	  planned	  economies	  in	  Eastern	  Europe,	  and	  the	  right-­‐wing	  wave	  in	  the	  Anglo-­‐Saxon	  countries.	  During	  the	  crisis	  years	  in	  the	  beginning	  of	  the	  1990’s	  the	  support	  for	  the	  public	  sector	  started	  increasing	  again,	  as	  well	  as	  the	  resistance	  against	  privatization.20	  The	  latest	  poll	  from	  SOM-­‐institutet	  shows	  that	  the	  support	  for	  the	  welfare	  state	  has	  not	  been	  as	  big	  as	  it	  is	  today	  any	  other	  year	  since	  the	  polls	  started	  in	  1986.21	  The	  long-­‐term	  perspective	  that	  can	  be	  seen	  from	  these	  polls	  indicate	  that	  the	  resistance	  against	  for-­‐profit	  has	  increased	  at	  the	  same	  rate	  as	  the	  support	  for	  the	  welfare	  state	  has	  increased.	  
2.3 Comparison	  of	  efficiency	  between	  for-­‐profit	  and	  not-­‐for-­‐profit	  Representatives	  from	  private	  welfare	  providers	  and	  right-­‐wing	  politicians	  have	  argued	  that	  the	  private	  sector	  has	  better	  efficiency	  and	  lower	  costs,	  or	  better	  service	  and	  innovativeness,	  but	  there	  is	  little	  evidence	  supporting	  these	  statements.22	  In	  the	  article	  Konkurrensens	  konsekvenser.	  Vad	  händer	  
med	  svensk	  välfärd?,	  leading	  Swedish	  welfare	  researchers	  state	  that	  research	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
16 Nilsson. ”Nej till vinstutdelning – Ja till valfrihet i välfärden”, 310-316. 
17 Nilsson. ”Välfärdspolitik och välfärdsopinion 1986-2012”, 89. 
18 Cederholm. ”Klar majoritet vill styra vinster i privat välfärd”. 
19 Nilsson. ”Välfärdspolitik och välfärdsopinion 1986-2012”, 88. 
20 ibid., 91. 
21 Nilsson. “Starkt stöd för välfärdsstaten”, 291. 
22 Anell. ”Hälso- och sjukvårdstjänster i privat regi”, 181. 
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concerning	  the	  effects	  of	  the	  political	  welfare	  reform	  in	  Sweden	  to	  a	  large	  extent	  is	  missing.23	  	  However,	  a	  large	  number	  of	  articles	  have	  been	  published	  comparing	  the	  quality	  of	  activities	  performed	  by	  different	  types	  of	  organizations	  worldwide.	  In	  one	  substantial	  article	  published	  in	  the	  highly	  respected	  British	  Medical	  Journal,	  researchers	  show	  that	  not-­‐for-­‐profit	  nursing	  home	  organizations	  are	  better	  staffed,	  and	  have	  higher	  educated	  staff	  than	  profit-­‐driven	  organizations.	  These	  circumstances	  are	  considered	  factors	  affecting	  the	  quality	  of	  the	  care.24	  In	  an	  American	  overview	  from	  2005	  performed	  by	  Schlesinger	  and	  Gray	  comprising	  150	  studies,	  not-­‐for-­‐profit	  hospitals	  were	  superior	  both	  concerning	  economic	  factors	  and	  quality.	  A	  British	  study	  shows	  that	  other	  factors	  are	  more	  important	  to	  the	  quality	  of	  hospital	  care	  than	  type	  of	  management	  method;	  one	  important	  factor	  is	  whether	  welfare	  is	  delivered	  in	  price	  competition,	  which	  showed	  to	  result	  in	  lowered	  quality.25	  Welfare	  service	  delivery	  is	  a	  complex	  industry	  to	  evaluate.	  The	  services	  differ	  from	  each	  other	  to	  a	  large	  extent,	  the	  quality	  is	  not	  necessarily	  best	  measured	  by	  customer	  satisfaction,	  and	  regulations	  that	  come	  with	  the	  welfare	  state	  make	  competition	  differ	  from	  other	  industries.	  However,	  the	  research	  available	  does	  not	  support	  the	  notion	  that	  price	  competition	  and	  for-­‐profit	  enhances	  quality	  or	  lowers	  prices.	  
2.4 The	  support	  for	  not-­‐for-­‐profit	  and	  social	  innovation	  The	  SOM	  poll	  from	  2013	  showed	  that	  only	  7	  %	  believed	  that	  a	  tax-­‐financed	  welfare	  company	  should	  be	  able	  to	  decide	  by	  itself	  where	  the	  profit	  goes,	  whereas	  80	  %	  thought	  that	  most	  part	  (30	  %)	  or	  all	  (50	  %)	  of	  the	  profit	  must	  be	  reinvested	  in	  the	  company.	  The	  figures	  indicate	  distrust	  against	  private	  for-­‐profit	  actors	  in	  tax-­‐financed	  industries.	  However,	  if	  private	  actors	  have	  other	  motives	  than	  profit,	  the	  public	  supports	  their	  existence	  alongside	  the	  public	  sector	  actors.	  In	  the	  2013	  poll	  around	  20	  %	  wanted	  to	  see	  private	  for-­‐profit	  enterprises	  as	  alternatives	  to	  the	  public	  organizations	  while	  a	  majority	  wanted	  not-­‐for-­‐profit	  organizations	  as	  options	  to	  the	  traditional	  state-­‐controlled	  bodies.26	  At	  the	  same	  time,	  the	  concept	  of	  social	  innovation	  is	  in	  the	  mouths	  of	  many.	  Economic	  crises,	  the	  ageing	  of	  the	  population	  in	  Europe	  and	  the	  climate	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
23 ibid., 200. 
24 Comondore et al.. ”Quality of care in for-profit and not-for-profit nursing homes”. 
25 Anell. ”Hälso- och sjukvårdstjänster i privat regi”, 202-204. 
26 Nilsson. ”Nej till vinstutdelning – Ja till valfrihet i välfärden”, 314-321. 
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threat	  have	  brought	  social	  issues	  back	  on	  the	  agenda.	  In	  the	  past,	  the	  traditional	  non-­‐profit	  associations	  were	  the	  vehicles	  for	  tackling	  these	  kinds	  of	  societal	  issues.	  However,	  these	  bodies	  are	  dependent	  on	  external	  funding	  from	  governments	  or	  private	  actors,	  making	  it	  difficult	  to	  perform	  activities	  in	  a	  long-­‐term,	  sustainable	  way.	  A	  way	  of	  solving	  these	  challenges	  could	  be	  found	  in	  social	  innovation,	  which	  serves	  as	  an	  umbrella	  concept	  for	  inventing	  and	  incubating	  solutions	  to	  social	  issues	  with	  innovative	  methods	  and	  not-­‐for-­‐profit	  purposes.27	  
2.5 Conclusion	  In	  the	  same	  way	  as	  the	  demographic	  situation	  in	  the	  first	  half	  of	  the	  1900’s	  led	  to	  the	  creation	  of	  the	  Swedish	  welfare	  state,	  and	  the	  political	  waves	  in	  Europe	  in	  the	  end	  of	  the	  1980’s	  influenced	  the	  decrease	  of	  the	  same	  welfare	  state,	  the	  economic,	  demographic	  and	  environmental	  issues	  of	  today	  signal	  that	  the	  interest	  for	  the	  welfare	  state	  has	  been	  brought	  back.	  Politically,	  the	  issue	  is	  polarized,	  but	  it	  is	  clear	  that	  the	  majority	  of	  the	  parliament	  politicians	  are	  not	  in	  favor	  of	  prohibiting	  for-­‐profit	  in	  welfare.	  The	  for-­‐profit	  rationale	  is	  the	  notion	  that	  an	  opportunity	  to	  earn	  profit	  creates	  competition	  that	  increases	  quality	  and	  decreases	  costs.	  Still,	  studies	  show	  no	  or	  very	  little	  evidence	  of	  these	  correlations	  in	  the	  welfare	  sector.	  Welfare	  services	  are	  both	  too	  complex	  and	  too	  non-­‐optional	  for	  them	  to	  function	  in	  the	  same	  way	  as	  the	  rest	  of	  the	  private	  market.	  The	  consumer	  of	  welfare	  products	  does	  not	  use	  these	  services	  in	  the	  same	  way	  she	  uses	  other	  services.	  The	  complexity	  makes	  them	  difficult	  to	  evaluate,	  and	  depending	  on	  the	  urgency	  of	  the	  need	  it	  may	  be	  impossible	  to	  make	  an	  informed	  choice,	  or	  choose	  to	  not	  use	  the	  service.	  Perhaps	  that	  is	  why	  market	  competition	  through	  for-­‐profit	  has	  not	  yet	  been	  able	  to	  make	  a	  convincing	  model	  in	  the	  welfare	  sector.	  It	  must	  not	  be	  forgotten	  that	  privatization	  and	  for-­‐profit	  are	  separate	  things,	  and	  it	  is	  the	  for-­‐profit	  part	  of	  the	  decrease	  in	  the	  welfare	  state	  that	  the	  public	  is	  resisting.	  Generally,	  freedom-­‐of-­‐choice	  is	  perceived	  positively	  in	  Sweden,	  and	  not-­‐for-­‐profit	  actors	  are	  requested	  as	  alternatives.	  Trends	  supporting	  the	  concept	  of	  social	  innovation	  enhance	  the	  opportunities	  in	  the	  welfare	  service	  market.	  Through	  social	  innovation,	  societal	  issues	  are	  viewed	  as	  opportunities	  for	  innovation,	  business	  model	  experimentation	  and	  entrepreneurial	  solutions,	  with	  societal	  purposes	  and	  sustainable	  business	  models.	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
27 DG Regional and Urban Policy. Guide to Social Innovation, 5-9. 
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It	  seems	  as	  if	  there	  is	  a	  giant	  market	  space	  for	  private	  actors	  wanting	  to	  deliver	  welfare	  services	  in	  a	  not-­‐for-­‐profit	  context.	  It	  is	  possible	  that	  private	  not-­‐for-­‐profit	  could	  deliver	  both	  low-­‐cost	  and	  high-­‐quality	  services.	  Still,	  the	  presence	  of	  social	  enterprises	  in	  the	  welfare	  system	  is	  missing.28	  The	  reason	  why	  could	  be	  that	  the	  structure	  of	  the	  limited	  liability	  company	  is	  not	  suitable	  for	  social	  purposes.	  There	  is	  a	  place	  for	  a	  different	  kind	  of	  company.	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
28 Palmås. Den misslyckade välfärdsreformen, 15. 
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3 The social enterprise The	  previous	  chapter	  suggests	  that	  the	  social	  enterprise	  could	  play	  a	  relevant	  part	  in	  the	  company	  landscape.	  The	  concept	  of	  the	  social	  enterprise	  is	  however	  not	  clear-­‐cut.	  Different	  actors	  make	  different	  interpretations	  of	  what	  is	  included	  in	  the	  concept,	  but	  in	  this	  context	  I	  will	  present	  an	  interpretation	  to	  what	  a	  social	  enterprise	  could	  mean.	  This	  chapter	  explains	  the	  defining	  characteristics	  that	  separate	  the	  social	  enterprise	  from	  other	  companies	  (section	  3.1).	  For	  the	  sake	  of	  clarification,	  I	  explain	  the	  terminology	  of	  some	  important	  concepts	  (section	  3.2).	  The	  chapter	  ends	  with	  the	  foundation	  of	  this	  paper,	  which	  is	  an	  analysis	  of	  what	  a	  social	  enterprise	  requires	  from	  the	  legal	  body	  representing	  it	  (section	  3.3).	  
3.1 Characteristics	  of	  the	  social	  enterprise	  The	  concept	  of	  the	  social	  enterprise	  builds	  on	  the	  entrepreneurial	  value	  that	  societal	  change	  can	  be	  made	  from	  economically	  sustainable	  business.	  The	  goal	  is	  to	  create	  a	  third	  sector	  acting	  as	  a	  hybrid	  between	  the	  public	  and	  private	  sector.	  A	  social	  enterprise	  is	  in	  this	  context	  a	  company	  with	  a	  social	  purpose,	  but	  which	  runs	  and	  finances	  its	  activities	  by	  using	  businesslike	  methods,	  as	  opposed	  to	  traditional	  charity	  organizations.29	  The	  social	  purpose	  can	  vary	  and	  extend	  to	  cover	  a	  lot,	  but	  essential	  is	  that	  it	  primarily	  should	  be	  something	  else	  than	  generating	  profit	  for	  the	  owners.30	  Often,	  the	  enterprise	  target	  the	  social	  needs	  or	  demands	  of	  the	  society	  or	  a	  group	  of	  people	  and	  try	  to	  improve	  the	  wellbeing	  of	  people.	  The	  social	  purpose	  is	  simply	  good	  for	  society.31	  This	  could	  mean	  that	  society	  benefits	  e.g.	  by	  reducing	  social	  exclusion,	  increasing	  welfare,	  establishing	  justice,	  etc.32	  	  Using	  businesslike	  methods	  means	  that	  the	  company	  aims	  to	  be	  financially	  independent	  through	  its	  own	  activities.33	  The	  purpose	  of	  the	  company	  is	  achieved	  not	  through	  donations	  or	  public	  funding,	  but	  by	  the	  business	  that	  the	  company	  is	  doing.	  The	  social	  enterprise	  can	  through	  the	  businesslike	  methods	  become	  a	  sustainable	  actor	  independent	  of	  the	  goodwill	  of	  external	  actors.	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
29 Palmås. Den misslyckade välfärdsreformen, 17-18. 
30 ibid., 17. 
31 DG Regional and Urban Policy. Guide to Social Innovation, 6. 
32 Palmås. Den misslyckade välfärdsreformen, 17. 
33 ibid., 17. 
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3.2 Terminology	  In	  Swedish,	  the	  term	  social	  enterprise	  (“socialt	  företag”)	  is	  not	  ideal,	  since	  
social(t)	  in	  Swedish	  has	  a	  slightly	  different	  meaning	  in	  Swedish	  than	  it	  does	  in	  English.	  In	  Swedish	  social(t)	  most	  accurately	  translates	  to	  the	  English	  “sociable”.	  “Socialt	  företag”	  is	  still	  the	  commonly	  used	  translation	  for	  these	  types	  of	  enterprises	  in	  Swedish,	  just	  like	  “social”	  also	  is	  used	  to	  describe	  social	  innovation	  and	  social	  entrepreneurship.	  The	  term	  is	  however	  to	  be	  interpreted	  as	  in	  its	  Anglo-­‐American	  meaning,	  and	  the	  purpose	  of	  social	  in	  these	  contexts	  should	  in	  English	  as	  well	  as	  in	  Swedish	  mean	  concerning	  
society,	  in	  Swedish	  “samhällelig”.	  Since	  the	  purpose	  of	  the	  enterprise	  is	  one	  part	  of	  the	  definition	  of	  the	  social	  enterprise,	  and	  the	  method	  in	  which	  it	  pursues	  its	  business	  is	  another,	  it	  is	  important	  to	  separate	  the	  variations	  of	  organizational	  setups.	  In	  this	  context,	  the	  terms	  for-­‐profit	  and	  not-­‐for-­‐profit	  should	  be	  interpreted	  as	  having	  a	  
purpose	  to	  generate	  profit	  for	  the	  owners,	  respectively	  having	  another	  purpose,	  which	  can	  be,	  but	  does	  not	  have	  to	  be,	  of	  a	  social	  nature.	  Included	  in	  the	  concept	  of	  not-­‐for-­‐profit	  are	  not	  only	  enterprises,	  but	  also	  what	  is	  commonly	  referred	  to	  as	  charities,	  non-­‐profits,	  non-­‐governmental	  organizations,	  private	  voluntary	  organizations,	  civil	  society	  organizations	  etc.	  The	  concept	  non-­‐profit	  refers	  to	  the	  traditional	  not-­‐for-­‐profit	  actors,	  such	  as	  associations	  and	  foundations	  that	  do	  not	  utilize	  businesslike	  methods.	  Non-­‐profits	  are	  often	  charity	  organizations	  of	  different	  kinds.	  Not-­‐for-­‐profit	  bodies	  include	  non-­‐profit	  associations	  and	  foundations,	  as	  well	  as	  not-­‐for-­‐profit	  enterprises.34	  
3.3 Requirements	  on	  the	  embodiment	  of	  the	  social	  enterprise	  Social	  enterprises	  have	  a	  challenge	  in	  finding	  a	  suitable	  legal	  body	  to	  represent	  their	  activities.	  Profit	  as	  a	  purpose	  is	  without	  exaggeration	  heavily	  dominating	  legal	  bodies	  with	  businesslike	  methods.	  Partnerships	  and	  limited	  liability	  companies	  have	  legal	  possibilities	  to	  conduct	  activities	  with	  non-­‐profit	  purposes,	  but	  it	  is	  very	  uncommon.35	  Not-­‐for-­‐profit	  is	  mainly	  represented	  by	  non-­‐profit	  associations	  and	  foundations.	  Custom	  should	  not,	  however,	  prevent	  an	  analysis	  of	  how	  not-­‐for-­‐profit	  could	  be	  represented.	  The	  characteristics	  of	  the	  required	  body	  should	  therefore	  be	  established,	  in	  order	  to	  compare	  the	  demand	  with	  the	  existing	  bodies	  at	  hand.	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
34 International Center for Not-for-Profit Law. Frequently Asked Questions. 
35 Skog. Rodhes Aktiebolagsrätt, 105-106. 
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3.3.1 A not-for-profit purpose The	  possibility	  of	  a	  social	  purpose	  is	  crucial	  for	  the	  social	  enterprise.	  The	  first	  issue	  for	  the	  social	  enterprise	  is	  to	  find	  a	  legal	  body	  where	  a	  social	  purpose	  is	  theoretically	  possible.	  Secondly,	  it	  must	  be	  able	  to	  keep	  the	  purpose	  consistent	  over	  time,	  and	  must	  be	  protected	  from	  other	  conflicting	  interests.	  
3.3.2 Businesslike methods The	  social	  enterprise	  must	  be	  able	  to	  make	  business	  transactions	  to	  make	  sure	  the	  body	  can	  survive	  without	  public	  or	  charitable	  funding	  in	  order	  for	  sustainability.	  A	  not-­‐for-­‐profit	  actor	  may	  also	  to	  a	  higher	  extent	  than	  a	  for-­‐profit	  actor	  need	  a	  body	  with	  heavy	  regulations,	  public	  accounting	  and	  a	  tradition	  of	  how	  to	  make	  transactions	  in	  order	  to	  be	  viewed	  as	  a	  trustworthy	  business	  partner.	  This	  is	  especially	  true	  when	  it	  comes	  to	  finding	  good	  investors	  and	  trusting	  suppliers.	  For	  the	  social	  enterprise	  in	  the	  third	  sector	  conducting	  social	  activities	  with	  businesslike	  methods,	  it	  is	  also	  crucial	  to	  embody	  the	  activities	  in	  a	  form	  that	  radiates	  credibility	  to	  the	  customers.	  
3.3.3 Limited liability Another	  aspect	  of	  the	  social	  enterprise	  is	  that	  it	  often	  conducts	  activities	  with	  high	  risk.	  Not	  only	  is	  social	  innovation	  often	  the	  core	  of	  the	  business’	  ideas	  –	  providing	  new	  and	  untested	  business	  models	  or	  products	  and	  services	  –	  but	  it	  is	  also	  often	  active	  in	  the	  welfare	  sector	  where	  the	  Act	  on	  Freedom	  of	  Choice	  and	  the	  Act	  on	  Public	  Procurement	  applies,	  making	  income	  uncertain	  due	  to	  the	  risk	  of	  rapid	  change	  in	  circumstances.	  More	  or	  less	  limited	  liability	  is	  therefore	  essential	  to	  create	  an	  environment	  where	  these	  kinds	  of	  entrepreneurs	  dare	  to	  test	  their	  concepts.	  
3.3.4 Controlled and consistent membership Qualified	  membership,	  meaning	  that	  owners/members	  consist	  of	  a	  controlled	  masse	  of	  persons,	  is	  important	  for	  any	  business.	  If	  the	  purpose	  of	  the	  company	  additionally	  is	  to	  serve	  society,	  it	  is	  desirable	  to	  have	  mechanisms	  ensuring	  that	  the	  enterprise	  can	  continue	  even	  after	  change	  in	  owner-­‐	  or	  membership,	  or	  the	  decease	  of	  a	  founder	  or	  idea	  provider.	  It	  also	  means	  that	  the	  enterprise	  needs	  to	  be	  less	  dependent	  on	  the	  influencing	  people	  than	  a	  for-­‐profit	  business	  is.	  For-­‐profit	  owners	  can	  choose	  to	  liquidate	  the	  company	  when	  suitable,	  change	  the	  main	  activities	  of	  the	  company,	  or	  in	  other	  ways	  control	  the	  course	  of	  the	  company	  as	  fits	  the	  for-­‐profit	  purpose	  best.	  A	  social	  enterprise	  that	  has	  another	  purpose	  needs	  to	  be	  independent	  enough	  that	  the	  owners	  or	  members	  cannot	  control	  it	  in	  self-­‐interest.	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3.4 Conclusion	  The	  social	  enterprise	  should	  have	  a	  social	  purpose	  combined	  with	  businesslike	  methods.	  This	  means	  that	  the	  not-­‐for-­‐profit	  purpose	  must	  both	  be	  legally	  possible	  and	  disconnected	  from	  the	  people	  behind	  in	  a	  sustainable	  way.	  It	  must	  also	  be	  a	  renowned	  actor	  that	  expresses	  trustworthiness	  and	  at	  the	  same	  time	  have	  the	  ability	  to	  conduct	  transactions	  in	  an	  easy	  way	  that	  can	  be	  scrutinized	  by	  other	  actors.	  The	  risky	  business	  of	  welfare	  and	  social	  innovation	  is	  supported	  if	  the	  body	  additionally	  has	  limited	  liability.	  It	  finally	  needs	  to	  be	  able	  to	  survive	  through	  changes	  of	  ownership	  and	  the	  purpose	  must	  be	  protected	  in	  one	  way	  or	  another	  to	  support	  the	  credibility	  of	  the	  company.	  Among	  the	  variations	  of	  legal	  persons	  and	  associations	  to	  represent	  a	  business	  is	  the	  limited	  liability	  company,	  especially	  suited	  for	  innovative	  development	  projects	  with	  high	  risk.	  The	  key	  is	  the	  possibility	  to	  limit	  the	  responsibility	  of	  the	  shareholders	  to	  no	  more	  than	  invested	  capital.	  The	  limited	  liability	  company	  also	  provides	  ownership	  as	  a	  requisite	  for	  influence,	  in	  contrast	  to	  an	  association	  that	  anyone	  (with	  some	  limitations)	  can	  join.	  This	  creates	  consistency	  and	  ensures	  that	  the	  business	  is	  run	  in	  a	  foreseeable	  way.	  The	  company	  can	  also	  stay	  intact	  even	  if	  a	  shareholder	  deceases	  or	  sells	  her	  shares,	  giving	  it	  development	  potential.	  The	  limited	  liability	  company	  is	  also	  very	  common,	  and	  viewed	  as	  a	  trustworthy	  business	  partner,	  having	  public	  accounting	  and	  detailed	  regulations.	  Many	  actors	  are	  used	  to	  conducting	  business	  with	  a	  limited	  liability	  company.	  The	  personal	  unlimited	  liability	  connected	  with	  partnerships,	  and	  the	  difficulty	  to	  control	  membership	  in	  associations,	  are	  only	  two	  of	  the	  reasons	  why	  the	  limited	  liability	  company	  is	  a	  standout	  association	  form	  with	  no	  comparison	  in	  Swedish	  law.	  Partnerships	  are	  additionally	  to	  a	  large	  extent	  dependent	  on	  the	  people	  behind	  them.	  Associations	  and	  foundations	  have	  high	  credibility	  when	  it	  comes	  to	  purpose,	  but	  lack	  the	  businesslike	  methods.	  Additionally,	  Swedish	  procurement	  legislation	  makes	  it	  difficult	  for	  non-­‐profit	  associations	  to	  compete,	  and	  tax	  legislation	  benefit	  international	  venture	  capital	  enterprises.36	  	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
36 Nilsson. ”Nej till vinstutdelning – ja till valfrihet i välfärden”, 322. 
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4 The limited liability company as a social enterprise The	  limited	  liability	  company	  is	  at	  first	  glance	  the	  only	  organizational	  setup	  matching	  the	  requirements	  of	  a	  social	  enterprise.	  However,	  even	  if	  the	  setup	  of	  a	  limited	  liability	  company	  is	  an	  optimal	  match	  when	  it	  comes	  to	  businesslike	  methods,	  providing	  possibilities	  for	  self-­‐financing	  and	  sustainable	  business	  without	  donations,	  the	  social	  purpose	  is	  not	  so	  easily	  incorporated	  in	  the	  limited	  liability	  company,	  as	  I	  will	  show	  in	  this	  chapter.	  The	  chapter	  commences	  with	  an	  analysis	  of	  the	  for-­‐profit	  purpose	  that	  is	  predominant	  for	  the	  limited	  liability	  company	  (section	  4.1).	  I	  challenge	  the	  notion	  that	  a	  for-­‐profit	  purpose	  is	  the	  only	  relevant	  option	  for	  the	  company	  and	  present	  to	  the	  reader	  the	  alternative	  of	  not-­‐for-­‐profit	  enterprises.	  Afterwards,	  I	  analyze	  the	  suitability	  for	  a	  not-­‐for-­‐profit	  purpose	  of	  the	  limited	  liability	  company	  to	  see	  if	  a	  limited	  liability	  company	  can	  be	  a	  social	  enterprise	  (section	  4.2).	  The	  chapter	  ends	  with	  the	  conclusion	  that	  the	  limited	  liability	  company	  lacks	  when	  it	  comes	  to	  enabling	  not-­‐for-­‐profit	  purposes	  (section	  4.3).	  
4.1 For-­‐profit	  purpose	  All	  activities	  a	  company	  performs	  are	  meant	  to	  lead	  to	  a	  certain	  purpose.	  According	  to	  the	  Companies	  Act	  3:3	  the	  purpose	  of	  the	  limited	  liability	  company,	  when	  nothing	  else	  is	  stated,	  is	  to	  distribute	  profits	  to	  the	  shareholders.	  This	  purpose	  has	  been	  constant	  in	  Sweden	  since	  the	  Companies	  Act	  of	  1848.37	  The	  meaning	  of	  3:3	  is	  that	  a	  limited	  liability	  company	  can	  be	  one	  of	  two	  kinds:	  for-­‐profit	  or	  not-­‐for-­‐profit.	  Starting	  by	  looking	  at	  the	  for-­‐profit	  purpose,	  the	  Companies	  Act	  lacks	  a	  further	  explanation	  or	  definition	  of	  what	  is	  meant	  by	  the	  purpose	  to	  distribute	  
profits	  to	  shareholders.	  There	  are	  mainly	  two	  matters	  that	  require	  clarification.	  The	  first	  unclear	  matter	  regards	  at	  what	  time	  profit	  should	  be	  distributed,	  and	  the	  other	  the	  subject	  to	  which	  profit	  is	  distributed	  or	  the	  possibility	  to	  make	  exemptions	  from	  the	  for-­‐profit	  purpose.	  
4.1.1 Time Profit	  can	  as	  stated	  before	  either	  be	  distributed	  to	  shareholders	  or	  reinvested	  in	  the	  company.	  Continued	  reinvestments	  can	  keep	  strengthening	  the	  company	  in	  a	  way	  that	  benefits	  the	  shareholders	  in	  a	  longer	  perspective.	  The	  company	  grows	  stronger	  while	  the	  shareholders’	  benefit	  will	  have	  to	  wait	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
37 Dotevall. Skadeståndsansvar för styrelseledamot och verkställande direktör, 376. 
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until	  a	  sale	  of	  the	  shares	  or	  liquidation	  of	  the	  company,	  or	  future	  higher	  dividends.	  Since	  there	  is	  no	  time	  limit	  for	  how	  long	  dividends	  can	  be	  postponed,	  it	  could	  be	  claimed	  that	  the	  company	  itself	  is	  the	  primary	  beneficiary,	  not	  the	  shareholders.	  
The	  company	  itself	  as	  the	  beneficiary	  is	  not	  a	  new	  notion.	  A	  debate	  between	  the	  two	  American	  professors	  Adolf	  Berle	  and	  E.	  Merrick	  Dodd	  in	  the	  1930’s	  was	  the	  starting	  point	  of	  the	  discussion	  of	  what	  is	  the	  purpose	  of	  a	  corporation.38	  The	  discussions	  began	  with	  an	  article	  published	  in	  Harvard	  Law	  Review	  by	  Berle	  and	  Means,	  stating	  that	  the	  purpose	  of	  a	  corporation	  is	  “the	  ratable	  benefit	  of	  all	  the	  shareholders”.39	  	  The	  article	  was	  retorted	  by	  Dodd,	  also	  in	  Harvard	  Law	  Review,	  stating	  that	  the	  corporation	  “has	  a	  social	  service	  as	  well	  as	  a	  profit-­‐making	  function”.40	  Eventually	  Berle	  joined	  Dodd’s	  view,	  which	  he	  presented	  in	  a	  book	  published	  in	  1954,41	  and	  the	  view	  of	  Dodd	  has	  affected	  American	  law	  so	  that	  the	  purpose	  of	  a	  corporation	  eventually	  was	  perceived	  to	  be	  its	  long-­‐term	  development.42	  The	  long-­‐term	  development	  of	  the	  company	  is	  very	  close	  to	  corresponding	  to	  the	  benefit	  of	  the	  company	  itself.	  John	  Kenneth	  Galbraith	  differentiated	  between	  profit	  maximization	  and	  
growth	  of	  the	  corporation	  in	  his	  book	  The	  New	  Industrial	  State	  from	  1967.	  He	  was	  of	  the	  opinion	  that	  profit	  maximization	  requires	  the	  firm’s	  managers	  and	  employees	  to	  align	  with	  the	  will	  of	  an	  unknown	  shareholder,	  whereas	  growth	  as	  the	  goal	  for	  the	  company	  is	  something	  that	  all	  stakeholders	  can	  relate	  to.43	  Hetherington	  similarly	  stated	  in	  an	  article	  in	  1969	  that	  growth	  of	  the	  company	  is	  in	  the	  interest	  of	  both	  the	  shareholders	  and	  the	  managers	  of	  a	  company,	  and	  that	  even	  shareholders	  aim	  for	  growth,	  not	  profit	  maximization.44	  In	  Germany,	  the	  expression	  “das	  Unternehmen	  an	  sich”	  meant	  that	  the	  company	  could	  have	  an	  interest	  of	  its	  own,	  which	  was	  separate	  from	  the	  interest	  of	  the	  shareholders.	  “The	  company	  itself”	  is	  no	  longer	  the	  leading	  theory	  in	  German	  corporate	  governance,	  but	  the	  purpose	  of	  the	  company	  is	  still	  considered	  to	  be	  its	  long-­‐term	  profitability,	  the	  survival	  of	  the	  company,	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
38 Dotevall. Skadeståndsansvar för styrelseledamot och verkställande direktör, 375-377. 
39 Berle & Means. The Modern Corporation & Private Property, 220. 
40 Dodd. ”For Whom Are Corporate Managers Trustees?”, 1148. 
41 Berle. The 20th Century Capitalist Revolution, 172-180. 
42 Dotevall. Skadeståndsansvar för styrelseledamot och verkställande direktör, 379. 
43 Galbraith. The New Industrial State, 214. 
44 Hetherington. “Fact and Legal Theory”, 260. 
26	  
	  
or	  the	  different	  variations	  of	  interests	  in	  the	  company,	  before	  short-­‐term	  maximized	  dividends.45	  The	  Companies	  Act	  gives	  no	  indications	  to	  how	  the	  time	  issue	  should	  be	  solved.	  The	  interest	  of	  the	  company	  itself	  is	  not	  recognized	  in	  the	  Companies	  Act,	  but	  it	  is	  still	  difficult	  to	  separate	  the	  interest	  of	  the	  shareholders	  from	  the	  interest	  of	  the	  company	  itself	  as	  long	  as	  the	  growth	  and	  long-­‐term	  survival	  of	  the	  company	  is	  so	  intimately	  connected	  to	  profitability.	  This	  difficulty	  is	  underlined	  by	  how	  little	  impact	  3:3	  in	  the	  Companies	  Act	  has	  when	  it	  comes	  to	  directors’	  and	  CEO’s	  responsibility	  for	  actions	  that	  seem	  to	  conflict	  with	  the	  purpose	  of	  the	  company.46	  47	  
4.1.2 Subject The	  purpose	  of	  the	  company	  is,	  again,	  to	  give	  profit	  for	  distribution	  to	  the	  shareholders.	  The	  shareholders	  are	  supposed	  to	  include	  all	  the	  present	  shareholders.48	  However,	  in	  the	  previous	  section	  I	  have	  shown	  that	  dividends	  can	  be	  postponed	  to	  infinity,	  which	  means	  that	  the	  interests	  of	  future	  shareholders	  to	  some	  extent	  are	  considered.	  The	  same	  can	  therefore	  be	  stated	  when	  it	  comes	  to	  the	  subject	  of	  profit	  distribution	  as	  for	  the	  time	  of	  the	  same:	  the	  interest	  of	  the	  company	  itself	  and	  that	  of	  the	  shareholders	  are	  difficult	  to	  separate.	  The	  law	  only	  recognizes	  the	  interest	  of	  the	  shareholders,	  but	  the	  interpretation	  of	  the	  law	  can	  lead	  to	  the	  conclusion	  that	  the	  interest	  of	  the	  company	  is	  actually	  what	  is	  considered.	  Another	  consideration	  is	  in	  regard	  to	  whether	  the	  company	  has	  a	  responsibility	  towards	  its	  employees.	  The	  consensus	  is	  that	  the	  company	  may	  not	  pursue	  activities	  violating	  the	  for-­‐profit	  purpose	  even	  to	  meet	  the	  demands	  from	  the	  Union	  or	  government.49	  Still,	  the	  company	  has	  obligations	  towards	  its	  employees,	  something	  that	  can	  be	  seen	  in	  the	  different	  forms	  of	  worker	  participation.	  Employees	  have	  at	  least	  a	  limited	  influence	  over	  the	  company.	  This	  is	  also	  something	  that	  has	  been	  recognized	  widely.	  Rostow	  published	  an	  article	  in	  1959	  in	  which	  he	  stated	  that	  there	  are	  other	  interests	  in	  a	  company	  that	  are	  considered	  except	  for	  profit	  maximization,	  one	  of	  which	  is	  the	  welfare	  of	  the	  employees.50	  In	  the	  Companies	  Act	  of	  the	  United	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
45 Dotevall. Skadeståndsansvar för styrelseledamot och verkställande direktör, 388-399. 
46 Dotevall. Skadeståndsansvar för styrelseledamot och verkställande direktör, 417. 
47 Sandström. Svensk aktiebolagsrätt, 204. 
48 Dotevall. Skadeståndsansvar för styrelseledamot och verkställande direktör, 376. 
49 Skog. Rodhes Aktiebolagsrätt, 106-107. 
50 Dotevall. Skadeståndsansvar för styrelseledamot och verkställande direktör, 380. 
27	  
	  
Kingdom,	  the	  directors	  of	  a	  company	  are	  obliged	  to	  consider	  the	  interests	  of	  the	  employees	  as	  a	  part	  of	  the	  success	  of	  the	  company.51	  Similarly,	  the	  company	  could	  be	  claimed	  to	  have	  a	  social	  purpose	  as	  well	  as	  a	  profit-­‐making	  one.	  Dodd	  claimed	  that	  since	  public	  opinion	  makes	  law,	  and	  the	  opinion	  of	  the	  public	  is	  that	  corporations	  have	  a	  social	  service,	  that	  must	  be	  the	  purpose	  of	  the	  company,	  besides	  its	  profit-­‐making	  function.52	  The	  possibility	  for	  a	  company	  to	  give	  gifts	  is	  an	  exemption	  from	  the	  profit	  purpose	  that	  shows	  how	  a	  company	  may	  not	  only	  give	  out	  gifts	  in	  order	  to	  attract	  goodwill,	  but	  for	  any	  purpose	  as	  long	  as	  the	  size	  of	  the	  donation	  is	  reasonable	  in	  consideration	  to	  the	  situation	  at	  hand.	  53	  This	  does	  not	  align	  with	  the	  otherwise	  supposed	  strict	  for-­‐profit	  purpose	  of	  the	  limited	  liability	  company.	  
4.1.3 Conclusion This	  is	  not	  a	  thesis	  concerning	  the	  for-­‐profit	  purpose	  of	  a	  corporation.	  What	  the	  discussion	  contributes	  to	  is	  showing	  that	  profit	  to	  owners	  is	  not	  the	  only	  given	  purpose	  for	  a	  company,	  but	  that	  other	  purposes	  are	  not	  considered	  to	  a	  high	  extent	  today.	  Many	  times	  the	  company	  has	  been	  viewed	  as	  a	  means	  for	  creating	  an	  efficient	  societal	  economy.	  The	  subjects	  for	  whom	  the	  company	  exists	  are	  supposed	  to	  be	  the	  present	  shareholders,	  since	  the	  purpose	  is	  to	  distribute	  them	  profit.	  However,	  if	  profit	  distribution	  is	  postponed,	  future	  shareholders	  or	  the	  company	  itself	  become	  the	  beneficiaries.	  Employee	  influence	  over	  corporate	  strategy	  and	  expectations	  on	  the	  company	  to	  perform	  social	  services	  also	  limit	  the	  exclusive	  rights	  of	  the	  shareholders.	  Conclusively,	  a	  for-­‐profit	  purpose	  is	  difficult	  both	  to	  interpret	  and	  to	  enforce	  against	  violations,	  and	  the	  interests	  of	  the	  shareholders	  risk	  being	  neglected	  for	  the	  interest	  of	  the	  company	  itself.	  As	  I	  will	  show	  in	  the	  next	  section,	  the	  not-­‐for-­‐profit	  purpose	  is	  even	  more	  problematic.	  
4.2 Not-­‐for-­‐profit	  purpose	  The	  profit	  purpose	  of	  a	  limited	  liability	  company	  is	  as	  stated	  earlier	  just	  one	  out	  of	  two	  possible	  purposes	  the	  company	  can	  have.	  The	  other	  purpose	  is	  however	  not	  constructed	  in	  a	  way	  that	  can	  fill	  the	  gap	  of	  all	  the	  interests	  that	  have	  been	  neglected.	  What	  I	  will	  show	  in	  this	  section	  is	  that	  a	  not-­‐for-­‐profit	  purpose	  is	  problematic	  to	  exercise.	  Therefore,	  that	  other	  purpose	  is	  actually	  not	  a	  practical	  alternative.	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
51 Companies Act 2006, Section 172. 
52 Dodd. ”For Whom Are Corporate Managers Trustees?”, 1147-1148. 
53 SFS 2005:551. Aktiebolagslag, 17:5. 
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4.2.1 Shareholders’ right of decision The	  Companies	  Act	  3:3	  states	  that	  if	  the	  activities	  of	  the	  company	  should	  have	  another	  purpose	  than	  to	  distribute	  profit	  to	  the	  shareholders,	  it	  must	  be	  stated	  in	  the	  articles	  of	  association.	  The	  articles	  of	  association	  can	  be	  changed	  by	  the	  shareholders’	  meeting.	  A	  change	  concerning	  the	  non-­‐profit	  purpose	  must	  be	  supported	  by	  at	  least	  two	  thirds	  of	  the	  votes	  and	  nine	  tenths	  of	  the	  shares	  represented	  at	  the	  meeting.54	  Changes	  in	  the	  articles	  of	  association	  are	  made	  with	  qualified	  majority,	  since	  they	  are	  the	  backbone	  of	  the	  company	  and	  should	  not	  easily	  be	  revised.	  Shareholders	  who	  engage	  in	  a	  company	  by	  purchasing	  shares	  or	  investing	  share	  capital	  at	  the	  founding	  of	  a	  company	  should	  not	  be	  forced	  to	  support	  activities	  of	  a	  completely	  different	  character	  than	  they	  could	  predict	  when	  the	  investments	  were	  made.	  Changes	  must	  be	  possible	  in	  order	  to	  adjust	  to	  the	  economic	  situation,	  but	  the	  Companies	  Act	  recognizes	  that	  it	  should	  not	  be	  easily	  done.	  The	  more	  intervening	  the	  changes	  are,	  the	  stricter	  is	  the	  qualified	  majority.55	  The	  view	  on	  what	  is	  considered	  to	  be	  strict	  can	  be	  seen	  in	  7:43,	  where	  the	  strictest	  majority	  is	  demanded.	  The	  first	  sentence	  acknowledge	  that	  a	  restriction	  in	  shareholders’	  right	  to	  profit	  distribution	  demands	  unanimity	  in	  the	  votes	  from	  the	  shareholder’s	  meeting,	  and	  at	  least	  nine	  tenths	  of	  the	  shares	  represented	  at	  the	  meeting.	  Changing	  the	  profit	  purpose	  is	  consequently	  considered	  to	  be	  the	  most	  intervening	  change	  that	  can	  be	  made	  in	  the	  articles	  of	  association.	  Changing	  from	  another	  purpose,	  e.g.	  a	  social	  purpose,	  to	  a	  profit	  purpose	  is	  consequently	  not	  considered	  as	  intervening	  as	  the	  other	  way	  around.	  Again,	  the	  qualified	  majority	  is	  required	  in	  order	  to	  protect	  the	  shareholders.	  It	  is	  natural	  that	  shareholders	  that	  expect	  profit	  should	  not	  easily	  be	  denied	  that	  right.	  In	  an	  enterprise	  with	  another	  purpose,	  however,	  the	  will	  of	  the	  shareholder	  is	  still	  prioritized,	  and	  it	  is	  even	  easier	  to	  change	  from	  a	  not-­‐for-­‐profit	  purpose	  than	  to	  one.	  The	  purpose	  lacks	  the	  same	  protection	  that	  the	  profit	  purpose	  has.	  This	  raises	  the	  question	  to	  whether	  the	  company	  actually	  can	  have	  another	  purpose,	  if	  it	  is	  still	  the	  will,	  or	  benefit,	  of	  the	  shareholders	  that	  prevail.	  Even	  if	  we	  disregard	  the	  different	  levels	  of	  difficulty	  for	  changing	  the	  articles	  of	  association,	  the	  possibility	  to	  change	  the	  purpose	  by	  qualified	  majority	  is	  not	  supporting	  the	  not-­‐for-­‐profit	  industry.	  Even	  if	  the	  shareholders	  do	  not	  revise	  the	  articles	  of	  association	  in	  order	  to	  change	  the	  not-­‐for-­‐profit	  purpose,	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
54 7:44. 
55 Skog. Rodhes Aktiebolagsrätt, 234-235. 
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as	  long	  as	  they	  are	  unanimous	  they	  can	  make	  decisions	  that	  directly	  oppose	  the	  purpose.	  This	  is	  especially	  relevant	  for	  companies	  with	  only	  one	  shareholder.	  Consequently,	  it	  becomes	  difficult	  for	  a	  social	  limited	  liability	  company	  to	  earn	  any	  social	  credibility.	  Even	  for	  a	  company	  that	  would	  actually	  serve	  its	  purpose	  all	  the	  way,	  it	  is	  difficult	  for	  the	  customers	  to	  completely	  trust	  it	  as	  the	  shareholders	  have	  the	  power	  to	  control	  the	  course	  of	  the	  company.	  In	  conclusion,	  a	  purpose	  other	  than	  for-­‐profit	  can	  be	  set	  aside	  by	  the	  shareholders	  either	  by	  changing	  the	  articles	  of	  association	  by	  decision	  of	  two	  thirds	  of	  the	  votes,	  or	  by	  unanimous	  support	  without	  a	  formal	  change.	  This	  means	  that	  the	  purpose	  of	  the	  company	  is	  always	  in	  the	  hand	  of	  the	  shareholders,	  and	  it	  is	  impossible	  for	  a	  third	  party	  to	  fault	  a	  decision	  of	  the	  shareholders	  that	  oppose	  the	  purpose	  of	  the	  company.	  The	  social	  credibility	  so	  important	  for	  the	  social	  enterprise	  is	  very	  difficult	  for	  the	  limited	  liability	  company	  to	  uphold,	  since	  a	  not-­‐for-­‐profit	  purpose	  can	  be	  changed,	  and	  the	  shareholders	  have	  incitements	  for	  making	  that	  change.	  	  
4.2.2  Other stakeholders It	  can	  be	  argued	  that	  shareholder	  supremacy	  is	  the	  only,	  and	  the	  reasonable,	  way	  to	  control	  a	  company.	  The	  shareholders	  are	  the	  ones	  investing	  capital,	  and	  therein	  taking	  the	  risk,	  and	  it	  is	  reasonable	  that	  they	  should	  have	  the	  power	  of	  control	  in	  the	  company.	  However,	  based	  on	  the	  stakeholder	  analysis,	  I	  will	  show	  how	  it	  is	  quite	  reasonable	  to	  consider	  also	  other	  actors.	  Stakeholders	  are	  in	  one	  way	  or	  another	  dependent	  on	  the	  company,	  which	  means	  that	  they	  have	  expectations	  on	  how	  the	  company	  will	  act.	  In	  some	  cases	  other	  stakeholders	  are	  considered	  legally,	  and	  in	  some	  cases	  not.	  It	  is	  known	  in	  the	  world	  of	  limited	  liability	  companies	  that	  power	  is	  divided	  between	  three	  bodies:	  the	  shareholders,	  the	  board	  of	  directors	  and	  the	  CEO.	  
The	  board	  and	  the	  CEO	  are	  liable	  to	  run	  the	  company	  in	  accordance	  with	  the	  purpose,	  whatever	  it	  may	  be.	  As	  stated	  earlier,	  so	  are	  not	  the	  shareholders	  however.	  In	  a	  conflict	  of	  interest,	  this	  could	  mean	  that	  the	  board	  and	  the	  shareholders	  have	  different	  views	  on	  how	  the	  company	  should	  act,	  but	  the	  will	  of	  the	  shareholders	  will	  prevail.	  It	  must	  be	  considered	  that	  a	  board	  member	  of	  a	  company	  with	  a	  not-­‐for-­‐profit	  purpose	  is	  likely	  to	  engage	  in	  the	  company	  for	  reasons	  other	  than	  the	  gain	  of	  the	  shareholders.	  The	  board	  member	  may	  well	  support	  the	  specific	  purpose	  and	  because	  of	  that	  purpose	  choose	  to	  direct	  the	  company.	  In	  a	  company	  with	  a	  not-­‐for-­‐profit	  purpose	  there	  are	  obviously	  other	  interests	  at	  stake	  than	  the	  money	  at	  risk,	  but	  it	  is	  still	  the	  shareholders	  risk	  that	  prevails	  when	  it	  comes	  to	  the	  power	  to	  change	  the	  purpose	  for	  own	  gain.	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Along	  the	  same	  line	  is	  the	  employee	  interest.	  Employees	  are	  considered	  in	  the	  sense	  that	  they	  are	  given	  some	  influential	  power	  over	  the	  company	  through	  different	  types	  of	  employee	  participation	  regulations.	  The	  company’s	  responsibility	  over	  its	  employees	  has	  been	  discussed	  earlier,	  but	  in	  this	  context	  can	  be	  added	  the	  perspective	  of	  why	  the	  worker	  chooses	  to	  be	  involved	  in	  a	  specific	  company.	  A	  not-­‐for-­‐profit	  purpose	  may	  well	  be	  a	  good	  reason	  for	  an	  employee	  to	  choose	  a	  specific	  employer.	  Another	  problem	  is	  that	  customers	  to	  a	  not-­‐for-­‐profit	  company	  may	  choose	  to	  purchase	  goods	  or	  services	  from	  the	  company	  particularly	  because	  it	  has	  a	  not-­‐for-­‐profit	  purpose.	  As	  I	  have	  shown	  earlier,	  for-­‐profit	  is	  especially	  antagonized	  within	  welfare,	  but	  in	  other	  industries	  as	  well	  may	  certain	  customers	  support	  a	  not-­‐for-­‐profit	  purpose	  due	  to	  social	  awareness.	  If	  the	  company	  can	  act	  against	  its	  stated	  purpose,	  customers	  may	  perceive	  that	  they	  have	  not	  received	  what	  they	  paid	  for.	  The	  changeability	  of	  the	  purpose	  make	  not-­‐for-­‐profit	  very	  unreliable	  in	  the	  limited	  liability	  company.	  Same	  arguments	  can	  be	  held	  for	  providers	  as	  well	  as	  for	  other	  investors	  than	  shareholders,	  such	  as	  banks	  and	  other	  types	  of	  financing.	  According	  to	  an	  analysis	  performed	  by	  KPMG,	  not-­‐for-­‐profit	  objects	  can	  be	  chosen	  specifically	  because	  of	  their	  not-­‐for-­‐profit	  purpose.	  In	  these	  cases	  other	  values	  are	  considered	  than	  return	  on	  investment.56	  These	  values	  can	  however	  not	  be	  protected	  from	  the	  supremacy	  of	  the	  shareholders.	  The	  company	  as	  a	  societal	  actor	  is	  no	  new	  notion.	  Perhaps	  that	  is	  why	  the	  Companies	  Act	  has	  made	  it	  possible	  for	  a	  limited	  liability	  company	  to	  have	  another	  purpose	  than	  distribution	  of	  profit	  to	  shareholders.	  Companies	  with	  a	  not-­‐for-­‐profit	  purpose	  are	  referred	  to	  as	  companies	  beneficial	  to	  the	  
community.	  In	  a	  company	  where	  the	  beneficial	  purpose	  can	  be	  changed	  for	  the	  benefit	  of	  the	  shareholders,	  the	  rationale	  of	  the	  beneficial	  company	  is	  lost.	  Shareholders	  are	  not	  the	  only	  decision	  makers	  in	  a	  company.	  The	  board	  of	  directors	  and	  CEO	  have	  large	  extents	  of	  strategic	  and	  managerial	  influence.	  Employees	  have	  the	  right	  to	  participate	  in	  important	  strategic	  decisions.	  Customers,	  providers	  and	  investors	  can	  influence	  the	  company’s	  strategy	  by	  choosing	  to	  conduct	  business	  with	  actors	  they	  find	  suitable.	  The	  problem	  with	  the	  not-­‐for-­‐profit	  purpose	  in	  the	  limited	  liability	  company	  is	  however	  that	  only	  the	  shareholders	  have	  power	  over	  the	  purpose	  of	  the	  company.	  In	  many	  cases	  it	  could	  be	  argued	  that	  this	  is	  the	  only	  reasonable	  outcome	  since	  the	  shareholders	  are	  taking	  a	  financial	  risk	  in	  order	  to	  possibly	  get	  returns	  on	  the	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risk.	  In	  a	  company	  without	  a	  for-­‐profit	  purpose,	  it	  seems	  reasonable	  that	  other	  stakeholders’	  interests	  should	  have	  higher	  importance	  to	  the	  strategy	  of	  the	  company.	  
4.2.3 Conclusion It	  is	  indicated	  that	  the	  for-­‐profit	  purpose	  is	  supposed	  to	  gain	  the	  shareholders,	  and	  that	  the	  Companies	  Act	  is	  built	  for	  this	  purpose.	  Financial	  risk	  is	  the	  core	  of	  the	  logic	  of	  the	  regulations,	  and	  the	  possibility	  of	  profit	  is	  the	  rationale	  why	  shareholders	  invest	  in	  a	  company.	  When	  another	  purpose	  is	  given	  the	  company,	  there	  are	  no	  differences	  in	  the	  structure	  of	  the	  regulations.	  Shareholders	  are	  still	  considered	  to	  be	  most	  suitable	  to	  make	  decisions	  regarding	  the	  purpose	  of	  the	  company.	  The	  Companies	  Act	  shows	  no	  support	  for	  other	  stakeholders’	  interests.	  Can	  we	  then	  speak	  about	  a	  limited	  liability	  company	  with	  a	  not-­‐for-­‐profit	  purpose?	  Definitely.	  Even	  though	  these	  actors	  are	  few,	  they	  do	  exist.	  However,	  it	  is	  not	  possible	  for	  a	  limited	  liability	  company	  to	  guarantee	  a	  not-­‐for-­‐profit	  purpose	  since	  the	  purpose	  can	  both	  be	  changed	  and	  overruled.	  The	  Companies	  Act	  gives	  no	  possibilities	  to	  enforce	  the	  not-­‐for-­‐profit	  purpose	  against	  the	  will	  of	  the	  shareholders.	  Perhaps	  the	  not-­‐for-­‐profit	  purpose	  can	  best	  be	  described	  as	  a	  norm	  that,	  similarly	  to	  the	  for-­‐profit	  purpose,	  does	  not	  have	  any	  legal	  enforceability.	  
4.3 Conclusion	  Returning	  to	  the	  definition	  of	  a	  social	  enterprise,	  it	  requires	  a	  social	  purpose	  and	  businesslike	  methods.	  The	  limited	  liability	  company	  is	  the	  only	  legal	  body	  that	  has	  a	  space	  for	  both	  of	  these	  conditions.	  At	  the	  same	  time,	  as	  I	  have	  shown,	  the	  social	  purpose	  of	  a	  not-­‐for-­‐profit	  company	  is	  problematic	  in	  the	  limited	  liability	  company	  setup.	  It	  must	  not	  be	  underestimated	  how	  important	  a	  strong	  and	  firm	  social	  purpose	  is	  to	  the	  social	  enterprise.	  The	  credibility	  of	  the	  company	  depends	  on	  the	  company	  not	  straying	  too	  far	  from	  the	  purpose.	  There	  are	  examples	  of	  companies	  that	  claim	  to	  work	  for	  public	  good	  and	  then	  are	  exposed	  as	  villains.	  The	  Body	  Shop	  is	  one	  company	  with	  a	  claimed	  social	  agenda.	  	  “The	  business	  of	  business	  should	  not	  just	  be	  about	  money,	  it	  should	  be	  about	  responsibility.	  It	  should	  be	  about	  public	  good,	  not	  private	  greed”	  said	  the	  founder	  Anita	  Roddick.57	  The	  Body	  Shop	  was	  exposed	  in	  1994	  as	  a	  fraud	  not	  conducting	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
57 The Body Shop. Företaget. 
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social	  business,	  and	  the	  expression	  “green-­‐washing”	  was	  established.58	  Not-­‐for-­‐profit	  enterprises	  build	  their	  entire	  reputation	  on	  the	  social	  purpose.	  The	  social	  purpose	  requires	  protection	  against	  the	  supremacy	  of	  the	  shareholders.	  Limited	  liability	  companies	  can,	  as	  I	  have	  shown,	  have	  another	  purpose	  than	  generating	  profit	  for	  the	  shareholders.	  This	  has	  been	  possible	  for	  a	  long	  time	  according	  to	  Swedish	  legislation.	  These	  rules	  have	  not	  been	  able	  to	  stop	  shareholders	  from	  still	  profiting	  from	  the	  company.59	  Another	  type	  of	  company	  is	  better	  suited	  for	  the	  social	  enterprise.	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
58 Entine. “Body Flop.” 
59 Prop 2004/05:178, 20. 
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5 The (svb) company as a social enterprise The	  limited	  liability	  company	  with	  specific	  limitation	  of	  dividends,	  also	  known	  as	  the	  (svb)	  company,	  is	  a	  particular	  type	  of	  limited	  liability	  company.	  Essential	  for	  the	  (svb)	  company	  is	  that	  the	  activities	  are	  conducted	  for	  another	  purpose	  than	  distributing	  profits	  to	  the	  shareholders.	  Regulations	  protecting	  the	  purpose	  make	  the	  (svb)	  company	  differ	  from	  other	  limited	  liability	  companies.	  The	  special	  regulations	  are	  designed	  to	  be	  in	  cohesion	  with	  the	  purpose	  and	  not	  with	  the	  will	  of	  the	  shareholders.	  The	  important	  ingredient	  is	  a	  limitation	  on	  how	  much	  of	  the	  yearly	  profit	  that	  can	  be	  transferred	  out	  of	  the	  company.	  This	  means	  that	  the	  main	  part	  of	  the	  profits	  remain	  in	  the	  company	  for	  new	  investments.	  In	  this	  chapter	  I	  present	  the	  (svb)	  company	  as	  an	  alternative	  for	  the	  social	  enterprise.	  The	  chapter	  starts	  by	  explaining	  why	  the	  (svb)	  company	  was	  introduced	  into	  company	  law	  (section	  5.1),	  and	  is	  followed	  by	  a	  brief	  description	  of	  how	  the	  company	  is	  regulated	  (section	  5.2).	  I	  discuss	  possible	  important	  consequences	  in	  order	  to	  give	  the	  reader	  a	  broader	  perception	  of	  what	  choosing	  the	  company	  structure	  can	  result	  in	  (section	  5.3).	  The	  theoretical	  introduction	  to	  the	  company	  type	  leads	  up	  to	  an	  evaluation	  of	  the	  (svb)	  company	  as	  an	  alternative	  body	  for	  social	  enterprises	  (section	  5.4).	  
5.1 (svb)	  rationale	  The	  intention	  with	  the	  (svb)	  company	  is	  to	  serve	  as	  an	  alternative	  for	  businesses	  with	  another	  purpose	  than	  distributing	  profits	  to	  the	  shareholders.	  The	  (svb)	  company	  was	  meant	  for	  businesses	  previously	  run	  publically,	  e.g.	  private	  companies	  within	  healthcare,60	  but	  the	  regulations	  controlling	  the	  (svb)	  company	  are	  not	  discriminating	  between	  companies’	  activities,	  and	  are	  not	  fitted	  especially	  for	  one	  type	  of	  business.	  Still,	  the	  form	  was	  created	  when	  the	  legislator	  saw	  a	  request	  for	  a	  new	  type	  of	  company	  structure	  in	  traditionally	  public	  activities	  performed	  by	  private	  actors.	  The	  (svb)	  company	  is	  suggested	  to	  suit	  private	  entrepreneurs	  within	  community	  care,	  but	  is	  as	  appropriate	  for	  not-­‐for-­‐profit	  companies	  with	  individual	  pricing	  as	  for	  private	  businesses	  funded	  by	  public	  financing.	  These	  motives	  correspond	  with	  the	  rationale	  for	  the	  social	  enterprise.	  
5.2 (svb)	  essentials	  (svb)	  companies	  are	  regulated	  in	  the	  same	  way	  as	  other	  private	  limited	  liability	  companies.	  Additionally,	  there	  are	  a	  few	  regulations	  to	  be	  found	  in	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chapter	  32	  of	  the	  Companies	  Act,	  following	  a	  certain	  logic	  concerning	  dividends	  and	  control	  mechanisms.	  There	  are	  no	  rules	  that	  provide	  administrative	  or	  economic	  advantages,	  or	  give	  more	  freedom	  to	  operate.	  The	  (svb)	  company	  is	  simply	  a	  stricter	  type	  of	  limited	  liability	  company,	  with	  regulations	  making	  sure	  that	  no	  value	  can	  be	  transferred	  out	  of	  the	  company	  above	  allowed	  rates,	  and	  structures	  for	  control	  of	  all	  the	  transfers.	  These	  regulations	  are	  what	  give	  the	  (svb)	  company	  its	  credibility.	  In	  order	  to	  evaluate	  the	  (svb)	  company,	  it	  is	  important	  to	  get	  an	  overview	  of	  the	  regulations	  controlling	  the	  company.	  In	  this	  section,	  I	  will	  briefly	  present	  the	  special	  regulations	  in	  chapter	  32	  of	  the	  Companies	  Act.	  The	  most	  important	  regulation	  is	  the	  specific	  limitation	  on	  dividends	  that	  is	  the	  foundation	  of	  the	  company	  type	  (5.2.1).	  Relating	  to	  the	  logic	  around	  dividends	  is	  the	  control	  mechanisms	  that	  ensure	  the	  limitation	  is	  adhered	  (5.2.2),	  and	  closely	  connected	  is	  the	  restraint	  on	  certain	  types	  of	  loans	  (5.2.3).	  There	  are	  finally	  some	  regulations	  that	  are	  specific	  for	  the	  (svb)	  company	  that	  limit	  the	  way	  the	  company	  is	  created	  (5.2.4)	  and	  terminated	  (5.2.5).	  
5.2.1 Profit distribution The	  limit	  for	  yearly	  dividends	  in	  an	  (svb)	  is	  the	  government	  borrowing	  rate	  +	  1	  %	  of	  what	  shareholders	  have	  contributed	  for	  shares,	  together	  with	  eventual	  outstanding	  dividends	  from	  the	  previous	  five	  years.61	  The	  limit	  is	  supposed	  to	  correspond	  to	  capital	  interest.	  The	  size	  of	  the	  allowed	  dividends	  is	  based	  on	  contributed	  share	  capital,	  not	  on	  the	  size	  of	  the	  profit,	  and	  will	  therefore	  be	  the	  same	  size	  every	  year	  (if	  the	  share	  capital	  remains	  the	  same	  and	  the	  company	  has	  declared	  profit).	  Distribution	  of	  dividends	  is	  not	  allowed	  if	  the	  company	  is	  making	  loss	  and	  at	  the	  same	  time	  does	  not	  have	  retained	  earnings,	  since	  dividends	  then	  interferes	  with	  the	  bound	  shareholder’s	  equity.	  Not	  only	  open	  distribution	  of	  profits	  decided	  by	  the	  shareholder’s	  meeting	  is	  limited	  in	  an	  (svb)	  company.	  All	  types	  of	  transfer	  of	  value	  must	  follow	  the	  same	  logic,	  and	  cannot	  accumulate	  to	  more	  than	  the	  allowed	  limitation.	  A	  transfer	  of	  value	  can,	  apart	  from	  dividends,	  consist	  of	  group	  contributions,62	  loans	  to	  shareholders	  or	  related	  persons	  that	  are	  not	  payment	  able,	  an	  object	  sold	  to	  a	  shareholder	  to	  a	  price	  at	  benefit	  value,	  an	  agreement	  with	  a	  gift	  streak,	  or	  any	  other	  type	  of	  retribution	  free	  transaction	  (open	  or	  covert	  distribution	  of	  profits).	  This	  means	  that	  a	  transfer	  of	  value	  that	  is	  included	  in	  an	  otherwise	  bilateral	  agreement	  of	  some	  sort	  is	  not	  allowed	  if	  the	  part	  of	  the	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  




agreement	  that	  is	  unilateral	  exceeds	  the	  limitation.	  The	  benefit	  value	  amounts	  to	  the	  part	  of	  the	  performance	  above	  the	  market	  value.	  If	  a	  transfer	  of	  value	  is	  made	  that	  exceeds	  the	  limitation,	  the	  receiver	  must	  return	  the	  value	  plus	  interest,	  in	  the	  same	  way	  as	  in	  another	  limited	  liability	  company.	  Additionally,	  the	  company	  will	  be	  liquidized	  if	  the	  value	  has	  not	  been	  returned	  during	  the	  processing	  time	  at	  the	  district	  court.	  Bolagsverket,	  the	  board,	  CEO,	  accountant	  or	  shareholders	  can	  report	  any	  breach	  of	  the	  regulations.63	  
5.2.2 Governance An	  (svb)	  company	  must	  have	  at	  least	  one	  accountant.64	  The	  accountant	  shall	  examine	  that	  the	  rules	  for	  transfer	  of	  value	  are	  not	  violated	  and	  make	  sure	  that	  the	  company	  specifically	  lists	  loans	  and	  securities	  within	  the	  same	  concern.	  In	  that	  way	  the	  accountant	  makes	  sure	  that	  the	  rules	  are	  not	  violated.	  Otherwise,	  the	  company	  is	  run	  in	  the	  same	  way	  as	  other	  limited	  liability	  companies.	  It	  is	  subject	  to	  penalty	  to	  deliberately	  or	  by	  serious	  negligence	  breach	  the	  regulations	  concerning	  listing	  of	  intra-­‐group	  loans.65	  
5.2.3 Some loans An	  (svb)	  company	  may	  not	  take	  capital	  or	  profit	  debenture	  loans,66	  since	  these	  types	  of	  loans	  have	  terms	  dependent	  on	  the	  economic	  development	  of	  the	  company.	  Reimbursement	  of	  a	  capital	  debenture	  loan	  is	  dependent	  on	  the	  company’s	  retained	  capital.	  The	  interest	  on	  a	  profit	  debenture	  loan	  depends	  on	  the	  profit	  of	  the	  company.	  These	  kinds	  of	  loans,	  in	  which	  the	  size	  of	  reimbursement	  is	  dependent	  on	  the	  result	  of	  the	  company,	  are	  not	  allowed.	  
5.2.4 Creation An	  (svb)	  can	  either	  be	  started	  as	  an	  (svb),	  or	  be	  transformed	  to	  one	  from	  a	  limited	  liability	  company	  by	  a	  decision	  of	  the	  shareholder’s	  meeting.67	  The	  firm	  must	  be	  followed	  by	  the	  label	  (svb).68	  It	  is	  also	  stated	  in	  the	  articles	  of	  association	  of	  a	  limited	  liability	  company	  if	  it	  is	  of	  (svb)	  kind.69	  In	  that	  way	  stakeholders	  can	  immediately	  see	  that	  the	  company	  is	  run	  without	  profit	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  









motive,	  and	  can	  easily	  differentiate	  between	  an	  ordinary	  limited	  liability	  company	  and	  an	  (svb)	  company.	  
5.2.5 Termination An	  (svb)	  company	  cannot	  be	  transformed	  into	  a	  public	  company	  or	  a	  private	  for-­‐profit	  company.70	  This	  asset	  lock	  is	  a	  way	  to	  make	  sure	  that	  the	  regulations	  concerning	  the	  (svb)	  company	  are	  followed.	  An	  (svb)	  company	  can	  only	  be	  part	  of	  a	  fusion	  or	  fission	  as	  the	  transferring	  company	  if	  the	  overtaking	  company	  also	  is	  an	  (svb)	  company.71	  An	  (svb)	  may	  be	  liquidized,	  but	  the	  shareholders	  will	  only	  get	  liquidating	  distribution	  equivalent	  to	  endowment	  capital	  and	  eventual	  outstanding	  dividends.	  The	  shareholders	  can	  therefore	  never	  get	  out	  more	  from	  the	  company	  than	  they	  put	  in.	  The	  rest	  of	  the	  eventual	  surplus	  after	  liquidation	  goes	  to	  other	  (svb)	  companies	  stated	  in	  the	  articles	  of	  association.	  The	  surplus	  can	  only	  go	  to	  other	  (svb)	  companies,	  never	  to	  a	  regular	  limited	  liability	  company.	  If	  no	  (svb)	  company	  has	  been	  stated	  in	  the	  articles	  of	  association,	  eventual	  surplus	  goes	  to	  Allmänna	  Arvsfonden.72	  
5.3 (svb)	  consequences	  When	  the	  structure	  of	  the	  (svb)	  company	  now	  has	  been	  laid	  out,	  the	  (svb)	  company	  can	  be	  evaluated	  from	  the	  aspect	  of	  its	  utility	  as	  a	  body	  for	  activities.	  The	  regulations	  around	  the	  company	  are	  quite	  simple,	  but	  there	  are	  implications	  to	  the	  legal	  structure	  that	  should	  be	  recognized.	  It	  must	  be	  considered	  that	  very	  few	  (svb)	  companies	  exist,	  which	  means	  that	  the	  consequences	  of	  being	  (svb)	  only	  can	  be	  anticipated	  and	  theorized	  around.	  Still,	  I	  have	  included	  some	  experiences	  based	  on	  one	  (svb)	  company	  situated	  in	  Gothenburg,	  in	  order	  to	  get	  perspective	  on	  what	  are	  only	  theoretical	  possibilities	  or	  risks	  and	  what	  may	  actually	  be	  significant	  advantages	  or	  problems	  revolving	  around	  the	  company	  form.	  It	  is	  important	  to	  keep	  in	  mind,	  however,	  that	  this	  is	  the	  experience	  of	  only	  one	  (svb)	  entrepreneur	  and	  not	  representative	  for	  the	  entire	  (svb)	  community.	  In	  this	  section	  I	  will	  present	  some	  of	  the	  aspects	  that	  affect	  the	  business	  and	  relations	  of	  an	  (svb)	  company.	  The	  topics	  are	  meant	  to	  address	  the	  possible	  concerns	  an	  entrepreneur	  considering	  the	  (svb)	  form	  may	  have,	  and	  are	  based	  on	  the	  concerns	  of	  the	  steering	  group	  in	  the	  pilot	  project	  that	  was	  the	  foundation	  of	  this	  paper.	  The	  first	  issue	  is	  the	  close-­‐at-­‐hand	  problem	  of	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finding	  investment	  capital	  in	  a	  not-­‐for-­‐profit	  business	  (5.3.1).	  The	  paper	  then	  discusses	  how	  the	  (svb)	  form	  affects	  group	  relationships	  (5.3.2),	  and	  the	  considerations	  that	  should	  be	  taken	  in	  other	  type	  of	  transactions	  than	  intra-­‐group	  that	  are	  interesting	  to	  the	  (svb)	  entrepreneur	  (5.3.3).	  
5.3.1 Financials In	  the	  government’s	  proposition	  on	  (svb)	  companies,	  the	  idea	  was	  that	  the	  (svb)	  stamp	  would	  serve	  as	  a	  goodwill-­‐binging	  guarantee.	  It	  is	  also	  thought	  to	  attract	  investors	  that,	  in	  order	  to	  venture	  capital,	  want	  guarantees	  that	  input	  and	  profits	  will	  stay	  in	  the	  company.73	  According	  to	  KPMG’s	  analysis,	  there	  may	  actually	  be	  a	  certain	  category	  of	  investors	  that	  specifically	  choose	  non-­‐profit	  objects	  for	  investments.	  These	  actors	  make	  other	  deliberations	  than	  investors	  only	  looking	  for	  as	  high	  return	  on	  investment	  (ROI)	  as	  possible.74	  This	  is	  also	  in	  line	  with	  what	  the	  founder	  and	  owner	  of	  the	  company	  Mitt	  Liv	  AB	  (svb)	  has	  experienced.75	  The	  logic	  can	  further	  be	  explained	  by	  a	  comparison	  with	  non-­‐profit	  associations	  and	  foundations,	  which	  are	  good	  examples	  of	  how	  ROI	  is	  not	  the	  only	  reason	  for	  investment.	  The	  possibilities	  to	  attract	  investors	  in	  an	  (svb)	  should	  be	  at	  least	  equal	  to	  non-­‐profit	  associations	  and	  foundations,	  and	  can	  be	  better	  if	  investors	  see	  the	  advantages	  with	  the	  body.	  It	  must	  be	  remembered	  that	  the	  not-­‐for-­‐profit	  incitement	  is	  a	  different	  one	  from	  maximized	  ROI.	  It	  is	  the	  type	  of	  investors	  that	  look	  for	  social	  purposes	  that	  are	  attracted	  by	  the	  (svb)	  company.	  Without	  saying	  that	  these	  actors	  are	  many	  or	  even	  close	  to	  comparing	  in	  number	  to	  the	  for-­‐profit	  investors,	  they	  do	  exist.	  This	  is	  something	  important	  to	  keep	  in	  mind	  when	  discussing	  the	  (svb)	  company	  further.	  Another	  difficulty	  in	  attracting	  investment	  capital	  or	  bank	  loans	  is	  that	  an	  (svb)	  company	  sometimes	  needs	  to	  be	  valued	  in	  an	  untraditional	  way.	  If	  the	  custom	  is	  to	  value	  a	  company	  by	  discounting	  estimated	  profits,	  the	  value	  of	  the	  company	  will	  be	  low	  even	  if	  it	  has	  a	  strong	  cash	  flow.	  This	  can	  affect	  how	  investors	  and	  loan	  providers	  calculate	  the	  risk	  of	  the	  investment.	  Still,	  in	  a	  not-­‐for-­‐profit	  company,	  investors	  and	  loan	  providers	  would	  be	  wise	  to	  utilize	  methods	  that	  are	  appropriate	  for	  a	  not-­‐for-­‐profit	  purpose.	  The	  problems	  occur	  when	  the	  organization	  performing	  the	  valuation	  have	  strict	  working	  models	  that	  are	  hard	  to	  set	  aside	  for	  one	  certain	  situation.	  This	  is	  something	  that	  the	  (svb)	  entrepreneur	  may	  have	  to	  consider.	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
73 Prop 2004/05:178, 21. 
74 KPMG. Almega; Översyn av möjliga konsekvenser av en ombildning av aktiebolag inom skola, 




Finally,	  the	  (svb)	  company,	  and	  more	  generally	  any	  company	  in	  the	  welfare	  industry,	  acts	  on	  a	  risky	  market.	  The	  market	  for	  welfare	  is	  controlled	  by	  the	  Act	  on	  Freedom	  of	  Choice	  (LOV)	  and	  the	  Act	  on	  Public	  Procurement	  (LOU),	  and	  income	  levels	  can	  change	  quickly.	  There	  are	  no	  guarantees	  that	  the	  (svb)	  company	  would	  stand	  better	  against	  these	  kinds	  of	  difficulties	  than	  any	  other	  actor.	  However,	  the	  importance	  of	  investments	  should	  not	  be	  overestimated.	  One	  of	  the	  advantages	  with	  the	  (svb)	  company	  is	  that	  it	  applies	  businesslike	  methods.	  As	  a	  social	  enterprise,	  the	  goal	  is	  to	  be	  financially	  independent	  by	  its	  own	  activities.	  The	  requirement	  for	  continuous	  funding	  that	  non-­‐profits	  experience	  is	  therefore	  not	  applicable	  to	  the	  (svb)	  company.	  When	  it	  comes	  to	  importance	  of	  investments	  in	  comparison	  with	  the	  for-­‐profit	  company,	  the	  pilot	  project	  GPCC	  Implement	  serves	  as	  a	  good	  example.	  The	  business	  model	  of	  what	  is	  to	  become	  the	  pilot	  (svb)	  company	  is	  based	  on	  activities	  that	  are	  self-­‐financed.	  The	  steering	  group	  wanted	  to	  avoid	  forcing	  the	  controlling	  company	  to	  invest,	  since	  no	  profits	  compensate	  for	  the	  risk,	  but	  since	  the	  project	  was	  self-­‐sustained,	  the	  issue	  was	  not	  of	  importance.76	  It	  is	  particularly	  for	  these	  kinds	  of	  projects,	  which	  have	  proven	  the	  concept	  of	  their	  business	  model,	  that	  the	  (svb)	  company	  is	  especially	  advantageous.	  
5.3.2 Group relationships Within	  a	  group,	  transfer	  of	  value	  is	  often	  made	  without	  it	  benefiting	  the	  shareholders	  directly.	  However,	  such	  transfers	  enable	  circumvention	  of	  the	  (svb)	  regulations	  that	  require	  all	  value	  to	  stay	  in	  the	  company.	  For	  this	  reason,	  there	  are	  also	  limitations	  to	  the	  size	  of	  group	  contributions	  from	  an	  (svb)	  company.	  The	  limitations	  follow	  the	  same	  logic	  as	  the	  dividends	  limitations:	  The	  total	  amount	  of	  value	  transfers	  may	  not	  exceed	  the	  allowed	  percentage,	  no	  matter	  who	  the	  receiver	  is.	  However,	  the	  limitation	  does	  not	  apply	  to	  group	  contributions	  if	  the	  contribution	  has	  businesslike	  character.	  Businesslike	  character	  means	  that	  the	  transaction	  is	  compatible	  with	  the	  activities	  the	  company	  normally	  performs.	  If	  the	  transaction	  is	  a	  normal	  step	  in	  the	  business	  it	  is	  considered	  to	  be	  businesslike.	  Determining	  what	  are	  businesslike	  transactions	  can	  be	  difficult,	  and	  the	  threat	  of	  liquidation	  can	  discourage	  group	  transactions	  altogether.	  Since	  group	  contributions	  are	  normal	  within	  groups,	  it	  can	  be	  an	  obstacle	  for	  a	  group	  to	  include	  an	  (svb)	  company	  that	  cannot	  be	  treated	  in	  the	  same	  way	  as	  the	  other	  non-­‐(svb)	  companies	  in	  the	  group.	  The	  controlling	  company	  will	  




need	  to	  consider	  the	  benefits	  and	  the	  obstacles	  of	  the	  (svb)	  company	  in	  order	  to	  evaluate	  its	  suitability	  for	  the	  group.	  If	  a	  controlling	  company	  performs	  services	  for	  the	  (svb)	  company,	  these	  services	  may	  be	  invoiced	  in	  a	  normal	  way.	  The	  pricing	  of	  the	  services	  are	  however	  of	  importance.	  Delivering	  payment	  without	  full	  compensation,	  e.g.	  by	  paying	  a	  generous	  price	  for	  a	  service,	  is	  considered	  a	  covert	  distribution	  of	  profit.	  Whatever	  is	  above	  the	  market	  value	  for	  the	  service	  is	  not	  allowed	  if	  it,	  together	  with	  other	  transactions,	  exceeds	  the	  limitation	  for	  value	  transfers.	  This	  can	  also	  be	  an	  obstacle	  for	  a	  group	  including	  an	  (svb)	  company.	  The	  difficulty	  to	  in	  beforehand	  decide	  what	  the	  market	  value	  for	  a	  service	  is	  can	  discourage	  the	  group	  to	  make	  intra-­‐group	  transactions,	  since	  the	  threat	  of	  liquidation	  is	  so	  severe.	  
5.3.3 Transactions Shares	  in	  an	  (svb)	  can	  be	  sold	  on	  the	  market	  as	  usual.	  What	  is	  relevant	  is	  that	  the	  value	  of	  the	  company	  is	  not	  decreased	  by	  a	  transaction	  from	  the	  company.	  Since	  a	  liquidation	  or	  sale	  of	  the	  company	  never	  will	  give	  the	  shareholder	  more	  than	  invested	  capital	  it	  is	  not	  very	  likely	  that	  a	  share	  will	  be	  sold	  to	  a	  value	  higher	  than	  the	  quota	  value.	  In	  a	  sale	  of	  assets	  and	  liabilities,	  the	  material	  and	  immaterial	  assets	  of	  the	  company	  are	  sold.	  In	  that	  kind	  of	  transaction,	  the	  company	  itself	  is	  the	  seller,	  and	  therefore	  the	  purchase	  price	  ends	  up	  in	  the	  company.	  Since	  the	  shareholders	  cannot	  extract	  the	  profit	  of	  the	  sale	  from	  the	  company	  it	  gets	  locked	  into	  the	  company.	  If	  the	  assets	  and	  liabilities	  are	  sold	  to	  prepare	  for	  a	  future	  liquidation	  the	  shareholders	  might	  want	  to	  sell	  them	  inexpensively,	  e.g.	  to	  a	  sister	  company,	  in	  order	  not	  to	  lock	  the	  profit	  into	  the	  company.	  The	  (svb)	  company,	  in	  contrast	  to	  another	  limited	  liability	  company,	  has	  no	  requirement	  to	  make	  profit,	  so	  a	  deliberately	  “bad	  deal”	  is	  not	  contrary	  to	  the	  articles	  of	  association.	  However,	  underselling	  assets	  is	  considered	  covert	  distribution	  of	  profits.	  Since	  all	  dividends,	  including	  covert	  distribution	  of	  profits,	  are	  considered	  transfer	  of	  value,	  the	  same	  limitation	  applies	  for	  the	  size	  of	  such	  a	  loss	  transaction	  as	  for	  open	  distribution	  of	  profits.	  
5.4 Conclusion	  The	  (svb)	  company	  can	  utilize	  the	  same	  businesslike	  methods	  as	  any	  other	  limited	  liability	  company,	  but	  with	  a	  social	  purpose	  that	  is	  protected	  by	  regulations	  and	  cannot	  be	  overruled	  by	  the	  shareholders.	  The	  not-­‐for-­‐profit	  stamp	  can	  give	  the	  company	  the	  same	  kind	  of	  credibility	  as	  a	  non-­‐profit	  association	  or	  foundation	  and	  at	  the	  same	  time	  be	  run	  as	  businesslike	  as	  a	  limited	  liability	  company.	  Additionally,	  it	  can	  stand	  out	  in	  a	  prominent	  way	  as	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a	  social	  enterprise.	  The	  (svb)	  company	  can	  be	  appealing	  to	  the	  public	  in	  a	  unique	  way.	  	  An	  example	  of	  this	  can	  be	  seen	  in	  the	  company	  Mitt	  Liv	  AB	  (svb),	  situated	  in	  Gothenburg.	  The	  founder	  of	  Mitt	  Liv	  AB	  (svb)	  says	  that	  she	  has	  only	  experienced	  advantages	  with	  the	  (svb)	  company	  in	  comparison	  to	  other	  types	  of	  associations.	  According	  to	  her,	  the	  (svb)	  company	  is	  an	  efficient	  type	  of	  company	  with	  possibilities	  for	  development	  and	  expansion	  is	  the	  same	  way	  as	  a	  limited	  liability	  company.	  Another	  advantage	  is	  the	  full	  insight	  and	  transparency	  that	  comes	  with	  the	  limited	  company	  and	  its	  heavy	  regulations	  and	  public	  accounting.	  These	  advantages	  that	  come	  with	  the	  limited	  company	  are	  combined	  in	  the	  (svb)	  company	  with	  the	  credibility	  that	  otherwise	  only	  can	  be	  attained	  by	  a	  non-­‐profit	  association	  or	  foundation.	  Customers	  respond	  well	  to	  the	  type	  of	  company	  that	  the	  (svb)	  is,	  and	  it	  attracts	  questions	  about	  its	  function	  and	  purpose.77	  Investors	  expecting	  high	  ROI	  will	  choose	  other	  objects	  than	  the	  (svb)	  company	  where	  dividends	  is	  bigger	  if	  everything	  works	  well,	  or	  will	  keep	  the	  money	  in	  the	  bank,	  where	  the	  interest	  might	  not	  be	  higher	  but	  is	  guaranteed.	  This	  means	  that	  it	  can	  be	  harder	  to	  attract	  venture	  capital	  to	  the	  company.	  Another	  risk	  is	  that	  it	  can	  be	  more	  difficult	  to	  receive	  bank	  loans.78	  With	  a	  risk	  of	  difficulties	  in	  the	  possibility	  to	  get	  a	  hold	  of	  venture	  capital	  from	  other	  actors,	  banks	  may	  see	  risks	  in	  providing	  loans.	  For	  companies	  with	  the	  need	  for	  continuous	  capital	  investments,	  the	  (svb)	  form	  may	  be	  risky.	  At	  the	  same	  time,	  Mitt	  Liv	  is	  a	  good	  example	  of	  an	  (svb)	  company	  where	  it	  has	  been	  unproblematic	  to	  attract	  investors,	  and	  the	  GPCC	  Implement	  case	  shows	  how	  the	  (svb)	  form	  especially	  suits	  business	  without	  constant	  need	  for	  capital.	  The	  problems	  with	  finding	  investment	  capital	  should	  not	  be	  overestimated.	  The	  threat	  of	  liquidation	  for	  the	  (svb)	  company	  can	  discourage	  what	  is	  otherwise	  considered	  normal	  transactions.	  This	  could	  mean	  that	  there	  is	  an	  administrative	  and	  structural	  obstacle	  connected	  to	  the	  (svb)	  company.	  Another	  risk	  is	  that	  authorities	  and	  other	  crucial	  actors	  for	  the	  company’s	  future	  may	  be	  skeptical	  to	  the	  (svb)	  company	  because	  of	  it	  being	  relatively	  unknown.	  Many	  times	  the	  (svb)	  form	  demands	  an	  explanation	  of	  its	  function	  before	  the	  business	  is	  treated	  seriously.79	  The	  (svb)	  form	  can	  disadvantage	  from	  being	  fairly	  unknown.	  On	  the	  other	  hand,	  it	  could	  also	  benefit	  from	  the	  not-­‐for-­‐profit	  stamp.	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6 The failure of the (svb) company The	  possibility	  to	  start	  a	  company	  of	  (svb)	  type	  has	  existed	  since	  2006,	  when	  chapter	  32	  was	  introduced	  to	  the	  Companies	  Act.	  Still,	  today,	  there	  are	  only	  89	  (svb)	  companies	  registered	  at	  Bolagsverket,	  and	  several	  are	  liquidated,	  in	  the	  process	  of	  liquidation,	  or	  bankrupted.80	  The	  introduction	  of	  the	  (svb)	  company	  into	  Swedish	  company	  law	  has	  not	  lead	  to	  the	  results	  that	  were	  anticipated.	  In	  the	  previous	  chapter	  I	  have	  laid	  out	  how	  the	  (svb)	  company	  functions,	  and	  what	  implications	  the	  regulations	  have	  on	  the	  success	  of	  the	  company.	  As	  I	  have	  shown,	  the	  (svb)	  company	  is	  well	  suited	  for	  the	  social	  enterprise.	  The	  difficulties	  associated	  with	  receiving	  outside	  funding	  and	  handling	  group	  relationships,	  as	  well	  as	  the	  care	  that	  need	  to	  be	  applied	  concerning	  transactions,	  are	  not	  obvious	  obstacles	  for	  a	  company	  that	  is	  deliberately	  social	  in	  its	  nature	  and	  aims	  to	  be	  financially	  independent.	  These	  difficulties	  are	  not	  the	  defining	  reasons	  as	  to	  why	  the	  (svb)	  company	  has	  failed	  to	  break	  through	  in	  the	  Swedish	  enterprise	  environment.	  The	  failure	  of	  the	  (svb)	  company	  is	  not	  the	  result	  of	  a	  lack	  of	  demand	  for	  a	  legal	  body	  for	  a	  social	  enterprise	  either.	  In	  chapter	  0-­‐4	  I	  have	  shown	  how	  for-­‐profit	  is	  antagonized	  in	  the	  welfare	  sector,	  how	  actors	  conducting	  activities	  battling	  the	  new	  emerging	  social	  issues	  demand	  a	  suitable	  legal	  structure,	  and	  how	  the	  existing	  legal	  bodies	  fail	  to	  meet	  the	  demands	  of	  a	  social	  enterprise.	  The	  (svb)	  company	  is	  a	  response	  to	  these	  demands,	  and	  the	  failure	  is	  not	  in	  the	  lack	  of	  demand	  or	  impossible	  rationale	  of	  not-­‐for-­‐profit,	  but	  in	  the	  political	  implementation	  of	  the	  (svb)	  company.	  The	  introduction	  of	  the	  (svb)	  company	  into	  Swedish	  company	  law	  was	  highly	  influenced	  by	  the	  British	  Community	  Interest	  Company	  (CIC)	  that	  was	  introduced	  in	  2005,	  only	  one	  year	  before	  the	  (svb)	  company.81	  CIC	  has	  been	  a	  success	  in	  the	  United	  Kingdom,	  where	  almost	  10,000	  companies	  existed	  in	  August	  2014.82	  A	  similar	  version	  can	  be	  found	  in	  the	  American	  Low-­‐profit	  Limited	  Liability	  Company	  (L3C).	  This	  type	  of	  company	  has	  been	  a	  modest	  success;	  there	  were	  a	  little	  more	  than	  1,000	  L3Cs	  in	  nine	  states	  in	  2014.	  The	  most	  important	  alternative	  to	  L3C	  is	  the	  Benefit	  Corporation,	  which	  was	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81 SOU 2003:98, 91-92. 
82 CIC Association. What is a CIC? 
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introduced	  in	  2010.	  The	  benefit	  corporation	  is	  allowed	  in	  over	  20	  states	  and	  almost	  1,000	  companies	  were	  registered	  in	  2014.83	  In	  this	  chapter	  I	  show,	  by	  doing	  a	  comparison	  with	  the	  mentioned	  company	  structures,	  the	  key	  factors	  for	  the	  failure	  of	  the	  (svb)	  company.	  The	  main	  problem	  is	  a	  lack	  of	  incentives	  (6.1),	  but	  much	  can	  also	  be	  explained	  by	  the	  missing	  political	  opinion	  making	  and	  the	  regulatory	  inconveniences	  (6.2).	  Other	  issues	  with	  the	  (svb)	  company	  as	  it	  is	  today	  include	  the	  difficulty	  in	  competing	  with	  existing	  larger	  private	  actors	  (6.3),	  and	  the	  low	  credibility	  of	  private	  not-­‐for-­‐profit	  generally	  in	  Sweden	  (6.4).	  
6.1 Incentives	  One	  of	  the	  important	  success	  factors	  for	  the	  UK	  Community	  Interest	  Company	  was	  the	  fact	  that	  it	  is	  structured	  in	  a	  way	  that	  benefits	  small	  startups.	  The	  entrepreneur	  who	  chooses	  to	  run	  a	  CIC	  gets	  a	  range	  of	  benefits	  that	  are	  not	  given	  for-­‐profit	  enterprises,	  and	  support	  from	  authorities	  and	  private	  financial	  institutions	  that	  battle	  the	  otherwise	  little	  more	  complicated	  structure	  and	  financial	  difficulties.84	  The	  American	  version	  of	  the	  not-­‐for-­‐profit	  enterprise	  is	  the	  Low-­‐profit	  Limited	  Liability	  Company	  (L3C).	  The	  incentive	  for	  these	  entrepreneurs	  is	  mainly	  associated	  with	  the	  possibility	  to	  receive	  program-­‐related	  investments.	  This	  type	  of	  venture	  capital	  is	  deductible	  for	  the	  donator,	  in	  a	  way	  that	  otherwise	  only	  has	  been	  possible	  in	  relation	  to	  charities.85	  Discussions	  have	  been	  made	  in	  the	  US	  if	  special	  tax	  incentives	  could	  increase	  the	  number	  of	  L3Cs,	  but	  so	  far	  this	  has	  not	  led	  to	  any	  legislative	  changes.86	  In	  Sweden,	  there	  are	  few	  incentives	  for	  social	  entrepreneurs	  to	  choose	  the	  (svb)	  company	  as	  a	  body	  for	  their	  activities.87	  The	  company	  form	  was	  introduced	  as	  an	  alternative	  due	  to	  the	  Act	  called	  stopplagen	  that	  prohibited	  private	  hospitals	  to	  make	  profits.	  The	  stopplag	  came	  into	  force	  in	  2006,	  but	  was	  abolished	  already	  in	  2007,	  which	  meant	  that	  there	  was	  no	  longer	  an	  obvious	  reason	  for	  private	  healthcare	  providers	  to	  choose	  the	  (svb)	  company	  as	  an	  alternative.88	  The	  regulations	  controlling	  the	  (svb)	  company	  give	  no	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advantages	  at	  all,	  and	  the	  consequence	  is	  that	  the	  (svb)	  company	  is	  perceived	  as	  nothing	  more	  than	  an	  unnecessarily	  complicated	  limited	  liability	  company.	  	  
6.2 Political	  efforts	  When	  stopplagen	  was	  abolished	  in	  Sweden,	  there	  was	  no	  threat	  to	  the	  many	  already	  existing	  private	  companies	  in	  the	  welfare	  industry.89	  Changing	  company	  form	  seemed	  like	  an	  unnecessary	  obstacle	  to	  the	  already	  existing	  welfare	  deliverers,	  especially	  since	  the	  Companies	  Act	  allows	  not-­‐for-­‐profit	  purposes	  within	  ordinary	  limited	  liability	  companies.	  The	  failure	  of	  the	  not-­‐for-­‐profit	  limited	  liability	  company,	  and	  the	  limited	  liability	  company	  in	  general,	  as	  an	  alternative	  for	  social	  enterprises,	  was	  not	  discussed	  further	  in	  the	  high	  levels	  of	  politics.	  The	  importance	  of	  political	  measures	  for	  the	  success	  of	  the	  third	  sector	  enterprises	  can	  be	  seen	  even	  clearer	  in	  the	  United	  States.	  Legislation	  passing	  adoption	  of	  L3C	  in	  new	  states	  has	  regressed	  in	  the	  last	  years,	  making	  it	  difficult	  for	  new	  companies	  to	  establish.	  Benefit	  Corporations	  are	  however	  being	  allowed	  in	  an	  increasing	  number	  of	  states,	  and	  is	  anticipated	  to	  be	  allowed	  in	  almost	  all	  states	  shortly.	  The	  impact	  of	  the	  political	  measures	  cannot	  be	  underestimated.	  State	  legislation	  also	  differs	  when	  it	  comes	  to	  the	  administrative	  burden	  associated	  with	  starting	  a	  Benefit	  Corporation.	  In	  Nevada,	  for	  example,	  the	  administrative	  process	  is	  very	  simplified,	  which	  is	  one	  reason	  why	  there	  is	  high	  Benefit	  Corporation	  activity.90	  In	  Sweden,	  the	  (svb)	  company	  is	  still	  a	  very	  unknown	  form	  of	  enterprise,	  with	  very	  little	  coverage	  in	  the	  scientific	  literature.	  The	  political	  opinion	  making	  required	  for	  the	  form	  to	  lift	  off	  as	  a	  serious	  alternative	  to	  the	  traditional	  legal	  bodies	  is	  missing,	  except	  at	  the	  very	  left	  of	  the	  political	  sphere.	  The	  British	  Labour	  government	  that	  introduced	  the	  CIC	  structure	  was	  in	  comparison	  to	  the	  Swedish	  government	  a	  much	  better	  opinion	  maker	  in	  favor	  of	  the	  new	  generation	  of	  social	  entrepreneurs.91	  There	  is	  no	  doubt	  that	  social	  innovation,	  social	  entrepreneurship	  and	  social	  enterprises	  are	  widely	  appraised	  in	  the	  political	  sphere	  also	  in	  Sweden,	  but	  the	  politicians	  have	  taken	  no	  measures	  when	  it	  comes	  to	  supporting	  these	  concepts	  in	  a	  concrete	  manner.	  Chapter	  32	  of	  the	  Swedish	  Companies	  Act	  only	  allows	  a	  company	  to	  be	  run	  with	  limited	  dividends,	  but	  does	  not	  take	  into	  consideration	  the	  unique	  situation	  of	  the	  social	  enterprise.	  If	  social	  enterprises	  are	  to	  stand	  a	  chance	  in	  the	  welfare	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
89 ibid., 33. 
90 Cooney et al. Benefit Corporation and L3C Adoption: A Survey. 
91 Palmås. Den misslyckade välfärdsreformen, 34. 
44	  
	  
landscape	  they	  need	  support	  when	  it	  comes	  to	  their	  incorporation	  to	  sustainable	  and	  reliable	  legal	  structures.	  
6.3 Competitiveness	  (svb)	  companies	  are	  often	  acting	  in	  the	  welfare	  industry,	  which	  is	  controlled	  by	  the	  Act	  on	  Public	  Procurement.	  The	  public	  procurement	  system	  in	  healthcare	  is	  very	  complex	  for	  a	  small	  actor	  to	  get	  into.92	  Only	  a	  company	  with	  resources	  to	  finance	  extensive	  legal	  efforts	  will	  have	  possibilities	  to	  get	  involved	  with	  the	  complex	  regulations,	  and	  that	  will	  favor	  larger	  and	  established	  actors.93	  In	  order	  for	  the	  social	  entrepreneur	  to	  compete	  in	  the	  welfare	  market,	  there	  need	  to	  be	  supporting	  structures	  that	  help	  the	  company	  develop.	  The	  CIC	  was	  initially	  supported	  by	  a	  development	  fund,	  which	  gave	  out	  loans	  to	  social	  entrepreneurs	  that	  need	  financial	  support.	  The	  loan	  was	  then	  paid	  back	  to	  the	  fund	  by	  companies	  that	  were	  successful	  in	  order	  to	  grant	  other	  social	  entrepreneurs	  new	  possibilities	  for	  growth	  and	  competiveness.	  The	  funds	  were	  controlled	  by	  an	  independent	  consortium,	  consisting	  of	  four	  actors	  in	  the	  shape	  of	  social	  banks	  and	  civil	  society	  organizations.	  The	  Labour	  government	  acknowledged	  that	  governmental	  officers	  are	  not	  knowledgeable	  enough	  about	  social	  entrepreneurship	  and	  handed	  over	  the	  responsibility	  to	  public	  procured	  loaning	  institutions	  with	  good	  insights	  to	  the	  reality	  of	  the	  social	  entrepreneurs.94	  The	  development	  fund	  was	  abolished	  by	  Cameron’s	  government95,	  but	  it	  gave	  the	  CIC	  the	  start	  that	  was	  needed	  for	  the	  concept	  to	  be	  recognized	  among	  the	  entrepreneurs.	  Acknowledging	  the	  problems	  of	  small	  entrepreneurs	  is	  essential	  in	  order	  to	  encourage	  (svb)	  companies,	  who	  very	  much	  struggle	  with	  these	  typical	  issues.	  Adding	  on	  the	  fact	  that	  (svb)	  companies	  often	  act	  in	  the	  welfare	  industry	  makes	  this	  issue	  even	  more	  pressing.	  The	  development	  fund	  in	  the	  UK	  is	  a	  good	  example	  of	  how	  legislation	  and	  political	  measures	  can	  encourage	  certain	  types	  of	  entrepreneurship	  with	  good	  result,	  and	  is	  perhaps	  something	  the	  Swedish	  system	  can	  learn	  from.	  
6.4 Credibility	  In	  the	  United	  Kingdom,	  the	  private	  social	  enterprise	  has	  been	  able	  to	  retain	  a	  high	  level	  of	  credibility.	  In	  contrast,	  the	  (svb)	  company	  is	  often	  met	  with	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skepticism.	  Loan	  providers,	  municipality	  officials	  and	  other	  actors	  important	  to	  the	  future	  of	  the	  company	  are	  hesitant	  towards	  the	  unfamiliar	  form;	  just	  the	  opposite	  of	  what	  was	  intended.96	  This	  matter	  is	  an	  obvious	  sign	  of	  how	  information,	  political	  measures,	  and	  supporting	  structures	  can	  help	  or	  fail	  in	  these	  kinds	  of	  matters.	  The	  CIC	  is	  built	  upon	  the	  very	  same	  logics	  as	  the	  (svb)	  company	  is,	  but	  the	  results	  differ	  substantially.	  The	  problem	  does	  not	  seem	  to	  lie	  in	  the	  logic	  of	  the	  company,	  but	  in	  the	  way	  it	  has	  been	  sold	  to	  the	  public,	  industry	  and	  financing	  actors.	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7 Conclusion It	  is	  important	  to	  stress	  the	  fact	  that	  social	  enterprises	  are	  not	  direct	  competitors	  to	  for-­‐profit	  companies.	  It	  is	  obvious	  that	  for-­‐profit	  plays	  an	  indescribably	  large	  part	  in	  welfare	  as	  well	  as	  other	  parts	  of	  society.	  For-­‐profit	  is	  neither	  immoral	  nor	  ineffective,	  and	  it	  is	  undoubtedly	  a	  crucial	  incentive	  for	  most	  entrepreneurs	  to	  start	  a	  business.	  It	  is	  not	  my	  intention	  to	  in	  any	  way	  portray	  the	  for-­‐profit	  company	  as	  an	  outdated	  actor.	  With	  that	  being	  said,	  it	  is	  also	  clear	  that	  there	  is	  a	  place	  for	  other	  types	  of	  enterprises.	  The	  social	  issues	  of	  society,	  the	  tradition	  of	  the	  welfare	  state,	  and	  the	  resistance	  towards	  tax-­‐financed	  for-­‐profit	  have	  created	  a	  predominant	  majority	  demanding	  not-­‐for-­‐profit	  alternatives,	  which	  may	  in	  fact	  be	  as	  effective	  (or	  more)	  than	  the	  for-­‐profit	  alternatives.	  This	  does	  not	  necessarily	  mean	  that	  for-­‐profit	  should	  be	  banned	  from	  the	  welfare	  industry,	  or	  that	  not-­‐for-­‐profit	  should	  be	  premiered.	  What	  it	  implies	  is	  only	  that	  there	  is	  a	  great	  space	  for	  a	  legal	  possibility	  to	  run	  a	  not-­‐for-­‐profit	  company	  as	  well.	  In	  order	  for	  the	  social	  enterprise	  to	  be	  able	  to	  become	  a	  serious	  actor	  in	  the	  industry,	  the	  body	  must	  allow	  the	  unique	  circumstances	  of	  the	  social	  enterprise	  to	  fit.	  The	  social	  purpose	  in	  combination	  with	  the	  businesslike	  methods	  must	  be	  supported	  by	  the	  company	  structure	  if	  entrepreneurs	  are	  to	  engage	  in	  the	  social	  industry.	  The	  limited	  liability	  company	  is	  the	  only	  company	  that	  by	  its	  exceptional	  structure	  supports	  high-­‐risk	  projects,	  is	  sustainable	  due	  to	  its	  changeability	  in	  ownership,	  and	  is	  credible	  enough	  to	  inhabit	  a	  social	  cause.	  It	  has	  been	  suggested	  before	  that	  a	  strict	  for-­‐profit	  purpose	  should	  not	  be	  the	  only	  alternative	  for	  a	  business.	  This	  may	  be	  the	  reason	  why	  the	  Companies	  Act	  allows	  another	  purpose.	  However,	  the	  legislator	  still	  protects	  the	  for-­‐profit	  purpose	  to	  a	  higher	  extent	  than	  the	  not-­‐for-­‐profit	  one,	  and	  still	  leaves	  the	  destiny	  of	  the	  company	  in	  the	  hands	  of	  the	  owners	  who	  can	  change	  the	  purpose	  in	  self-­‐interest.	  The	  setup	  gives	  little	  trust	  to	  a	  company	  claiming	  social	  purposes,	  since	  the	  structure	  is,	  if	  not	  fragile,	  at	  least	  changeable.	  The	  solution	  could	  well	  be	  the	  (svb)	  company,	  which	  by	  the	  asset	  lock	  protects	  the	  purpose	  of	  the	  company	  in	  a	  way	  that	  the	  limited	  liability	  company	  does	  not.	  The	  setup	  fulfills	  all	  the	  theoretical	  demands	  of	  a	  social	  enterprise.	  And	  still,	  the	  company	  has	  not	  been	  successful.	  Lack	  of	  incentives	  for	  the	  entrepreneurs	  has	  made	  the	  leap	  to	  the	  new	  company	  type	  less	  attractive,	  and	  missing	  support	  structures	  and	  a	  lack	  of	  propaganda	  for	  the	  type	  show	  how	  little	  political	  effort	  there	  is	  to	  practically	  reinforce	  the	  company.	  The	  difficulties	  for	  small	  entrepreneurs	  to	  compete	  are	  not	  helped	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